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ABSTRACT
This thesis presents an industrial case study of the hotel-motel
industry in New England. The study attempts to examine a series of
empirical and theoretical questions pertaining to the industry in the
region and the U. S. Investigation focuses on three inter-related issue
areas concerning capital investment in the region: the influence of
risk and seasonality; the effect of economic conditions (i.e., the business
cycle); and the capital/labor substitution phenomena. The case study
includes an extensive historical analysis of the origin on the hotel-
motel industry, and presents a discussion of recent trends of industrial
performance and structure.
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CHAPTER I: INTRODUCTION
Hotels and motels constitute a growing industry whose primary functions
are to provide lodging, food service, and meeting facilities for the business
and recreational needs of the country. The industry occupies a key posi-
tion in the large "travel" segment of the economy, and is part of the
expanding service sector. Receipts for the first time are expected to
exceed $20 billion in 1979.
Despite its obvious importance, relatively little effort has been
directed towards developing a full understanding of this industry. Com-
menting on its own investigation of the travel industry in 1973, the
National Tourism Resources Review Commission noted that it felt "like
an explorer who has stumbled upon a new continent."1 This is, in part,
due to the fact that both industry and, to a certain extent, organized
labor have chosen to keep a low profile and eschew federal and state
"interference.
The industry's situation of relative anonymity changed over the past
two years when it became increasingly involved in national and local pub-
lic policy debates. Proposals to institute gas rationing, boost the
minimum wage, and eliminate the "three-martini-lunch" business deduction
have all elicited strong, vocal protests, and predictions of dire conse-
quences by industry spokespersons.
Controversy has also surrounded the allocation of - at the time of
this writing - some 200 million dollars in the Department of Housing and
lNational Tourism Resources Review Commission, Destination U. S. A.,
Vol. 1, Summary Report, (Washington: Government Printing Office, June 1973),
p. 1.
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Urban Development's "Urban Development Action Grant" (UDAG) Program
to hotel and hotel-related projects. The purpose of these grants is to
obstensibly foster the "revitalization" of central cities. Critics charge
that most hotel jobs are low paying, "dead-end," and seasonal; while com-
plaining that the grants constitute an unnecessary capital subsidy to
projects which would have been built anyway.
The H. U. D. Secretary has rejected these criticisms and stated that:
"Hotels are the best employers of low and moderate income and unskilled
people that I can think of. It is possible to start as a dishwasher and
2
end up as a chef." H. U. D. estimates that 12,152 hotel jobs will be
either saved or created as the result of its fiscal 1978 UDAG program.
Moreover, the Department claims that these projects are all "leveraged" -
which is to say, that public UDAG funds stimulated private investment which
would not have occurred otherwise.
In the New England region, the lodging industry has recently stepped
up its efforts to increase government travel promotion budgets. As a result,
the New England Regional Commission has sponsored a $250,000 media campaign
with "I'll take New England Any Day" as its slogan. (Ironically, the
double entendre of this statement has escaped the slogan makers.) Industry
2 Quoted in, "Let 'em Wash Dishes," Disclosure (Chicago: National Train-
ing and Information Center, April 1978), p. 3.
3
Susan Jacobs, "The Urban Impacts of HUD's Urban Development Action
Grant Program," forthcoming in Norman J. Glickman (ed.), The Urban Impacts
of Federal Policies (Baltimore: John Hopkins University Press, 1979),
table 3.
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trade associations are also attempting to encourage individual state legis-
latures to increase public financial assistance to their industry. In
Vermont, for example, the industry has claimed that tourism is counter-
cyclical in recessionary periods. 4 In Massachusetts, the hotel-motel
association is backing a bill to provide state financing for convention
facilities as one means to increase industry revenues (although the rationale
being used is that it will boost tax revenues).
Individual hotel projects have sparked conflict within metropolitan
areas. In Boston, the conundrum surrounding a proposed 395-room hotel
slated for the Waterfront area has resulted in the dismissal of the city's
redevelopment director, an investigation by an independent city watchdog
agency, and strong neighborhood opposition. "We are being invaded!," a
neighborhood spokesperson insists, "Tourism is taking over here - it's
perpetual Mardi Gras. The hotel is the end of the line. I told that
Mayor White: 'You'll have to decide: will this be a business district
or a neighborhood?'" 5
Neighborhood activists in numerous cities link the current boom in
hotel development with what they perceive as the general trend towards
"gentrification" of the city and displacement of the poor. "They're al-
ready moving me out of my home," reports a Baltimore tenant. "Say they
offer me a hotel job and business goes bad. Then I'm out of a home and
4
"Survey '79," New England Business (Vol. 1, no. 1, January 16, 1979),
p. 33.
5 Janey Scott, "Long Wharf Politics," The Real Paper (Vol. 8, no. 24,
June 16, 1979), p. 6.
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a job, worse off than before." 6
Objective of the Study
This case study does not propose to directly address all of the
issues that have been raised thus far. Its objective is not to provide
a comprehensive study of employment in the industry or to fully discuss
the fiscal impacts of hotel-motel development. These are important
issues which merit careful consideration. They are timely questions
as well, both because the industry is about to enter the "boom" phase
of its "boom - bust" cycle, and because there are presently more and
more calls for public capital subsidies for this new construction.
The objective of this case study is to examine private invest-
ment in the hotel-motel industry in the New England region. The
study does not purport to be a definitive analysis of the industry in
the region. Rather, its purpose is to examine the structural dynamics
behind the placement of private investment in the industry, using
New England as a case example.
Methodology of the Study
The analysis is based on a mixture of new and existing data
sources. A great deal of information has been extracted from the U.S.
Bureau of the Census' Census of Selected Service Industries and
National Travel Survey. Regrettably, the last available complete year
for these Census data is 1972. Since data for 1977 is expected to
be published by late 1979/early 1980, no attempt has been made to
6.Disclosure, op. cit., p. 3.
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estimate updated figures based on the earlier survey, although some
advance statistics have been used.
The primary source of new information comes from structured
interviews with enterprise owners and managers, government officials,
trade unionists, and institutional lenders. These interviews were
conducted during the winter and early spring of 1979 in three New
England states. A total of twenty one such interviews were completed.
This study also makes new use of an existing data source. The
analysis of labor will depend partially upon output from the Social
Security Administration's one-percent sample Longitudinal Employee-
Employer (LEED) file covering the period 1967 - 1975.7
Organization of the Study
This case study is divided into four additional chapters. Chapter
II examines the historical origins of the modern hotel-motel industry.
The chapter emphasizes the economic functions that the industry
fulfills in servicing the business and recreational sectors. The
business sector utilizes hotels and motels to further the exchange
of produced commodities and support the administrative function of the
modern corporation; and to make the actual production process more
efficient through the transferance of information essential to production
planning and the advancement of production techniques.
7For a discussion of this source, see Barry Bluestone, Alan
Matthews and Lynn Ware, Worker Mobility in the New England Region
(Cambridge: Joint Center for Urban Studies of MIT-Harvard, New
England Economy Project, Working Paper No. 3, December 8, 1978).
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Chapter III presents a discussion of production and risk in the
industry. The chapter begins by examining the different types of
operations within the industry, i.e. hotels and motels. The balance
of the chapter consists of an analysis of the risk structure of the
industry -- both for different types of operations and different
geographical regions. The chapter concludes with a brief presentation
of various risk reduction strategies.
Investment in the lodging industry, as with other enterprise
groups, is predicated on profitability. But profitability, and even
the basis for profitability, is not always apparent in the hotel-
motel industry. Chapter IV examines the institutional aspects of
investment in the lodging industry. This includes an analysis of
investment over the past twenty years.
The final section, Chapter V, describes how the investment
decision is played out geographically; and what some of the implications
are for the New England region's workforce.
- 11 -
Chapter II: Historical Origins.
This chapter traces the history of the modern hotel-motel industry
from its origins in the early nineteenth century. Hotels emerged
as a new form (distinguishable from the earlier tavern) designed to
service the exchange needs of urban mercantilists. Hotels were considered
risky ventures from the outset, and their development was often linked
to urban land speculation.
Hotels, and later motels, have served important economic
functions -- furthering the exchange, production, material distribution,
and administrative goals of commerce. It was only later in the develop-
ment of the industry that hotels and motels became important services
to the leisure activities of the populace.
- 12 -
EARLY COMMERCIAL HOTEL: THE EXCHANGE AND LODGING FUNCTION
The modern commercial hotel emerged during the first decades of the
19th century as a direct outgrowth of the pecuniary interests of the urban
mercantilist class. The hotel provided the actual physical conditions
necessary for the successful completion of mercantile exchange activity.
So closely linked were the commercial and lodging uses that, between 1800
and 1860, the words "hotel" and "exchange" were practically synonomous.
The early hotel offered a physical arena for buyers and sellers, guardians
of commodities unable to go to market on their own account.
The Exchange Coffee House
The first grand hotel was Boston's Exchange Coffee House, which opened
in 1808. It was, at the time of its construction, "the largest building in
America" and Boston's first skyscraper -- rising to the then-unheard-of-
height of seven stories. The Exchange housed over 200 apartments containing
nearly 300 rooms, It boasted a huge Exchange Room with multiple galleries,
and a then-famous central staircase leading up to a naval observatory
within a gigantic, tin-plated dome. There were, in addition, numerous
ballrooms, dining halls, and "society rooms." 1
The Exchange Coffee House was built in response to a number of economic
and politicaldevelopments within mercantile Boston. These included: a
great increase in the number of commercial agents travelling to Boston, and
1
Doris E. King, "Early Hotel Entrepreneurs and Promoters, 1793-1860,"
Exploration In Entreprenuerial History (Cambridge: Harvard Research Center
in Entreprenuerial History, VIII, Feb., 1956), p. 152.
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inadequate lodging and exchange facilities within the city for them; a def-
iciency in physical support for local merchants; the growth of a large
pool of investment capital; the emergence of a burgeoning downtown real
estate market; and, the presence of leading mercantilists who recognized
the potential benefits that a hotel-exchange might bring to the city.
Both foreign and domestic commerce flourished in Boston during the
first decades of the 19th century. Foreign trade multiplied as the result
of American neutrality during the Napoleonic Wars, and was left largely
unaffected by Jefferson's restrictive Embargo in 1807 (which Boston merchants
chose to ignore). This expansion of trade brought with it a tremendous
increase in the number of importer's agents and European merchants into
the port city.
Boston also experienced an influx of travelling retailers eager to
purchase various provisions. By the early 1820's it could still be said
that: "In the United States there are no commercial travellers; consequently,
the shop or storekeepers are obliged to repair to larger towns... . There
is, therefore, always a great concentration of persons at the principal
seaports, to purchase groceries, woolens, cotton goods, etc." 2
This veritable invasion of commercial agents soon overburdened the
city's transient lodging houses, inns, and exchanges. A new Merchants
2Cited in Allan R. Pred, Urban Growth and the Circulation of Informa-
tion: The United States System of Cities, 1790-1840 (Cambridge: Harvard
University Press, 1973), p. 150
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Exchange was erected on State Street, hut most merchants continued to work
at their places of residence (also primarily on State Street). However,
as these original merchant's homes were converted into banks, insurance
offices, accounting houses, and other commercial services, many mercantilists
moved into new residences outside the limits of the original colonial town.
This decentralization of mercantile residence/place of work proved costly,
however, since "speculative marketing and complicated credit requirements
of the carrying trade required a location adjacent to the sources of market
information."3
Consequently, Boston merchants sought to return to the downtown area
where information was easily disseminated and transactions more easily
handled. Central location leant itself to increased efficiency at a given
cost, and - as a result - additional mercantile profits. This locational
advantage became increasingly apparent as trade expanded and hinterland
purchasers and commercial representatives flocked in increasing numbers to
established mercantile centers. However, the physical means of support
for this burgeoning activity in the downtown area was clearly deficient.
A new group of entrepreneurs, real estate speculators, emerged to
both accelerate and capitalize on the concentration of commercial activities
in the downtown core. Real estate speculators sought, either through buying
and selling or rental, to capture a portion of the increased mercantile
profit in the central commercial district.
3
David Ward, "The Industrial Revolution And The Emergence of Boston's
Central Business District," Economic Geography (Vol. 42, No.2, April, 1966),
p. 157.
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This speculative activity was itself fueled by mercantilists in search
of investment opportunities. It is estimated that, during the first half
of the nineteenth century, mercantile interests were absorbing fully 42
cents out of each dollar of final sales.4 New legal and financial forma-
tions (i.e., the joint stock company) greatly increased the liquidity and
mobility of this capital and facilitated investment activity in new areas
of business.
When Andrew Dexter, Jr., Boston lawyer and real estate speculator,
set out to "found" the nation's first grand hotel in 1806, the commercial
need and financial structure necessary to support such a venture were al-
ready in place. What Dexter soon discovered, however, was that hotel under-
takings entail considerable front-end risk and require adequate working
capital during the rent-up stage.
Dexter purchased the block of land formed by Congress, Devonshire,
Water and State streets in the heart of the downtown. He gave purchase-
money mortgages to the sellers and commenced construction utilizing his
own private capital. The hotel portion of the building opened in May, 1808,
but by the following January Dexter had run out of operating cash. Dexter
mortgaged all of his holdings to the Berkshire Bank of Lenox, Massachusetts.
This capital infusion kept him in business until June, when the bank took
possession of the half-finished structure and Dexter retired to Nova
Scotia.5
4 Theodore Marburg, "Income Originating in Trade," in Trends in the
American Economy in the Nineteenth Century (Princeton: 1960), p. 21.
5
King, Op. cit., p. 152.
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Immediately after Dexter's ruin, Boston's leading citizens moved in
to rescue the Exchange. A new "Exchange Company" was formed, with prominent
Boston lawyer Harrison Gray Otis as President 6 , and the city's leading
merchants, bankers, and insurance company officials as associates. The
State Legislature was induced to pass an act incorporating the associates,
and $250,000 was raised through the sale of public stock. The Exchange
Company purchased the hotel from the Berkshire Bank and completed the
Exchange portion of the building. 7
Until its destruction by fire in 1818, the Exchange was "the boast of
Boston" and "the very centre of business activity in the Massachusetts
capital."8 The owners were praised in the Boston press as "respectable
gentlemen" whose "liberality" in improving the building had kept them
from making any dividend "of consequence." 9
6 Ibid., Otis was "A Harvard graduate, a leading Federalist politican,
destined to win fame as mayor, congressman, and U. S. District Attorney, but
his fortune came from real estate investments."
7 Ibid.
8 Robert B. Ludy, Historic Hotels of the World (Philadelphia: David
McKay Co., 1927), p. 132.
9 New England Palladium, Nov. 6, 1818; Columbia Centinel, Dec. 26, 1818,
cited in op. cit., King, p. 152.
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Significance of the Exchange Coffee House
The significance of the Exchange is, according to one writer, "that
it is probably the first House in which a whole city manifested great civic
pride, and for which a city admitted its urgent need."10 While the exchange
hotel itself did not appear to earn a competitive rate of return on invest-
ment (it initially went bankrupt), it served the collective needs of the
mercantile community.
Through the provision of central location and essential amenities
for exchange activities, the Exchange Coffee House helped to speed up the
actual physical movement of merchant's commodities. Goods unloaded at
the docks remained warehoused pending the completion of the sales process.
Full profit was only realized when these goods completed their route of
circulation to intermediary retailers and final consumers, and money
capital was returned to merchants and the initial producers of commodities.
The development of the hotel as market place facilitator (or service
industry) can be viewed as part of the general attempt to minimize the
11
amount of capital required for successful mercantile ventures. Hotel-
exchanges were instrumental in reducing the amount of time during which
commodities remained in circulation and the capital associated with them
remained tied up. This had the effect of maximizing the rate of profit.
1 0
'King, op. cit., p. 153.
1 1 Alfred Watkins, "Mercantile Cities and the Phase Of Primitive Capital-
ist Accumulation in the United States," unpublished Ph. D. dissertation
(Auttin: University of Texas, no date).
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The construction of hotels - as. well as transportation and communication
infrastructure - reduced the turnover time of merchants capital through
increasing efficiency in the exchange and movement of goods. The process
of buying in order to sell dearer was thus quickened, and the rate of
profit increased.
It is little wonder, therefore, that after the "success" of the Exchange
"dozens of cities, large and small, were to have merchant's groups build
such houses 'for the honor of the town.'"12 The profit margin on many of
these exchange-hotels must have been slight, for in the Panic of 1819 a
good many of them went out of business. New hotel construction did not
begin again until the Depression had lifted in 1825.
The Exchange Coffee House, and many of the other early hotels, served
as a site of collective consumption for urban mercantilists. The hotels
were used to complete transactions (some houses issued their own script),
lodge travelling merchants, provide food and entertainment, and act as a
source of information. Although the hotels were instrumental in raising
the general rate of profit, it is unclear that the houses themselves
served as great sources of capitalistic accumulation. The earliest attempt
to resolve this contradiction was to place hotel ownership with those
leading mercantists secure enough in their wealth to accept a marginally
lower rate of return.
The second attempt was aimed at increasing profitability through the
introduction of professional management. Previously, the innkeeper had
12
King, Op. cit., p. 153.
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been a sole proprietor living on the premises. With the Exchange Coffee
House, management was separated from ownership and given responsibility over
staffing and procurement of material goods.
Inter Urban Competition and Luxury Consumption
Competition, especially among port cities, for increased domestic and
foreign trade became acute after the economic recovery of 1825. "A complex
of city imperialisms arose," notes Arthur Schlesinger, Sr., "each scheming
for domination, each battling with its rivals for advantage." 1 3
One important manifestion of this inter-urban competition was new hotel
construction. Mercantile elites competed among each other to produce the
largest and most luxurious hotels. Generally, a group of "civic minded"
merchants would take the lead and form a hotel company. The official spokes-
person of such a goup was likely to be "a lawyer-politican, with a past
record of real-estate speculation." 1 4
Chief among the hotels of this period were Baltimore's City Hotel and
Boston's Tremont House. The City Hotel, which opened in 1826, was planned,
1 3 Arthur Schelesinger, Sr., "The City in American Life," in P. Kramer
and F. L. Holborn, eds., The City in American Life (New York: Putnam's,
1970) p. 28.
1 4King, Op. cit., p. 156.
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15
owned, and financed by the Brown family of Baltimore. The hotel was
managed by the same man who had run the Exchange Coffee House. The City
Hotel was so important to the commercial and social life of the city that
in 1860, when the hotel became involved in litigation, a Baltimore judge
ruled that the house must be kept open because as a "firs-t-class hotel" it
had become a "public institution and a public necessity."16
Boston's Tremont House opened in 1829 and had an almost immediate effect
throughout the country. As one commentator noted:
Every city in the nation... wanted a hotel as grand as the
Tremont, or better, and got it as speedily as possible, whether
there was business enough to justify it or not. Generally, there
was not, but American enterprise had accepted the theory that good
hotels make for much travel, and that no city amounts to anything
unless it has one or more which the community can lavish prodigal
admiration and which gives outsiders a favorable impression of the
city's greatness, enterprise, and hospitality.17
The Tremont House stood as the standard of luxury for the nation's hotels.
It was built (at a cost of $200,000) and owned by a company headed by William
Harvard Eliot and several other leading merchants. The Tremont featured
1 5Alexander Brown and Sons was the only American-based firm among the
leading Anglo-American merchant bankers. The Browns were also the principal
organizers and backers of the Baltimore and Ohio Railroad. See Alfred
Chandler, The Visible Hand, p. 28.
16
King, Op. cit., p. 154.
1 7Jefferson Williamson., The-American Hotel, An Anecodatal History (New
York: Alfred A. Knopf, Inc., 1920), p. 28.
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170 private rooms, doors with- locks, indoor plumbing, and every room supplied
with free soap.18 The Tremont catered "only to the upper stratum of European
visitors and those Americans who were getting on in the world;" and made
19
itself exclusive "by fixing a flat two-dollar-a-day rate" (approximately
three days wages of a non-agricultural worker). "The hotel lobby, like the
outer rooms of a royal place," comments one writer, "became a gathering
place, a vantage point for a glimpse of the great, the rich, and the power-
ful." 20
The Tremont House featured a new, more advanced, division of labor
within the firm. The Tremont introduced the first bellboys (called "rotunda
men") as a luxury service. The hotel also witnessed the standardization
of food service. Previously, food was placed on a large table at once and
guests ate their fill. In the Tremont, a "French system" was installed
whereby guests were divided into small groups for service and each given
whatever he ordered. In addition, the Tremont House introduced a sort of
military drill for the waiters. This procedure was especially pronounced
at banquets, when waiters would march in simultaneously with each course.
18
Lundberg, Donald E. The Hotel and Restaurant Business. 2nd Edition.
Boston: Cahners Books International, 1976.
19
Ibid.
20
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Merchants' groups in other port cities tried to match the luxury of
the Tremont House. Philadelphia's United States Hotel was erected (1828)
directly opposite the Second Bank of the United States. New York saw the
construction of Holt's Hotel (1833) and John Jacob Astor's emmense Astor
House (1834). The Astor House was constructed at a cost of $400,00021
contained over 340 guestrooms, and employed 103 male and 65 female workers2 2
(an employee/room ratio roughly equivalent to today's luxury hotels).
Competition also developed among business elites within certain
cities. In New Orleans, rivalry between the Yankee and Creole merchant's
communities turned into a contest as to which could build the biggest
hotel. The St. Charles was built by the Yankees for the staggering sum
of $800,000.23 French businessmen initially planned a $1,500,000 hotel,
but this was scaled down considerably as the result of the financial crisis
of 1837.24
New Towns and Railroads
Hotel construction was not limited to the major port cities. Promoting
a good hotel was often considered necessary to attract people to new towns.
2 1 Brian McGinty, The Palace Inns (Harrisburg: Stackpole Books, 1978),
p. 18.
2 2Williamson, Op. cit., p. 197.
2 3 The hotel served as a home for the State's Stock Exchange and Chamber
of Commerce; and served as resort for the wealthiest planters.
2 4McGinty, Op. cit., p. 19. Their St. Louis Hotel was considered a
"poor immitation" and cost a "mere" $500,000. The lobby of the hotel was
used for public slave auctions.
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In reality, of course, a certain amount of economic activity was the essential
ingredient for new-town formation. Hotels served as the center of exchange
activity, housed nascent public administration functions, and provided a
certain amount of flexibility in a tight housing market. The hotel itself
may have been a necessary, but certainly not a sufficient condition for
.25
new-town formation.
Railroads, on the other hand, were very important for towns, and hotels
emerged to service them. Once commercial relations were established in the
seaport cities, an extensive commerical infrastructure was created to service
the transport and purchase aspects of mercantile activity. Both mercantile
and state surplus capital were directed into the construction of roads,
canals, steamships, and railroads. Factors, acting as the agents of urban
merchants appeared in the major western market centers to purchase crops
and other goods and arrange for their shipment. 2 6
The great absolute increase in both the number of commercial trans-
actions and travelling business agents led to the construction of new
hotel-exchanges - usually at the site of a railroad terminal. Worcester,
25"At Port Sheldon, Michigan, a hotel, The Ottawa House, was built at
a cost of $200,000 in the heart of a black pine forest. This was in 1837.
By 1842, five years later, the city had failed to materialize, and the hotel
was dismantled, and the four pillars which graced its front were dragged
away by ox team to become part of a mansion in Grand Rapids," Lundberg,
Op. cit., p. 20.
2 6 Watkins, Op. cit., pp. 36-37.
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for example, saw the construction of the Worcester Exchange Hotel, and
Springfield got its Massasoit House (1843). Both were the outgrowth of
the Boston and Worcester and, later, the Western Railroad. In Boston,
the terminus city, the South Cove Company built a complex which included
a wharf, luxury hotel, railroad terminal, wharehouses, and six miles of
new streets. 2
7
The railroad companies themselves did not become involved in hotel
development until after the 1850's. Soon thereafter "nearly all railroads
had extensive holdings, either directly or by means of subsidiary companies."
companies." 28
Producer-Oriented Hotels
Beginning in approximately 1830, manufacturer's agents began to
appear as hotel guests along side the merchant's wholesale commission
agents.. The hotel quickly came to service the producer of goods as usefully
as it had aided the mercantist. The development of new urban markets
enabled the manufacturer to expand into new and more distant regions. In
the hotel, the producer or agent or commissioned middleman -- took orders and
2 7Walter Muir Whitehead, Boston: A Topographical History (Cambridge:
Bel Knap Press, 1959). By 1838, the Boston and Worcester railroad was
carrying 100 passengers a day to and from Worcester.
2 8Williamson, Cp. cit., p. 121.
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arranged for the exchange of goods and money. Hotels became instrumentalities
for the organization of new markets, and thus assisted in opening new pos-
siblities for heightened production and accumulation.
Hotels were useful in enabling the manufacturer to appropriate a
larger portion of the surplus extracted in the manufacturing process itself.
The construction of hotels in important market areas provided physical
support for the manufacturer's own sales agent or wholesaler.
Hotels built in factory centers helped to create the essential com-
mercial infrastructure that allowed the manufacturer to manipulate the
distribution of surplus value more effectively at the point of production
itself. Sales terms were arranged which were more advantangeous to the
producer, and on his own "turf" as well. The general effect of this new
exchange activity in market/consumption centers and in production centers
was to shift the distribution of the surplus away from the mercantilist
and towards the producer.29 In each instance the hotel - if properly
located - was able to share, albeit to some lesser extent, in this increase
in producer's profitability.
New England, as the birthplace of American manufacturing, also initiated
the first producer-oriented hotels. In Lowell, Massachusetts, a "first-
class" hotel, the Merrimack House, was built during the same year (1832)
29 As Watkins (p. 14) notes, "The success of merchant's capital is ...
based on the establishment of conditions which ensure its ultimate subject-
tion to industrial interests." The construction of a transportation and
commercial infrastructure succeeded in speeding the movement of goods and
information, but - by extending and deepening the market - increased the
opportunity for more direct access by manufacturers.
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as were the mills.30 In Manchester, New Hampshire, the Amoskeag Manufac-
turing Company built a hotel on company owned land in 1840 and leased it
.31
to an operator on a long-term basis.
These factory-hotels serviced the management as well as the exchange
function of the early manufacturing company. Cotton textile production
in Lowell and Manchester was owned and administered by entrepreneurs in
Boston. In the pre-telegraphic era, management information exchange
required frequent inter-urban travel32 and hotel use.
The Commercial Hotel and the Distribution of Manufactured Consumer Goods
As the railroad expanded across the country following the Civil War
a new distribution system for consumer goods arose. Retailers no longer
made biannual trips to eastern markets to purchase dry-goods. Instead,
full-line, full-service, wholesalers went "by the cars" to towns and
villages on the railroads, and by horse and buggy to the most distant
country stores.
The travelling merchant no longer sold on commission, but rather
purchased the goods from the manufacturer and sold to the small retailers.
30
Henry A. Miles, The Growth of Lowell, 1846, in Charles N. Glabb,
ed., The American City (Homewood, Ill.: Dorsey Press, 1963), p. 130.
31
Luddy, Op. cit., p. 213.
32 Pred, Cp. cit., p. 214.
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The commission merchant became a full-time specialized jobber. This system
worked to the benefit of the retailer who found it less necessary to go
to market. It also reduced his storage needs and enabled him to adopt
a more flexible buying policy.- As Chandler notes, these new arrangements
pleased the manufacturer as well:
They now obtained cash. for their products instead of waiting
for payment for six months to a year until the product was finally
sold. Payments in cash substantially reduced the manufacturer's
requirements for working capital and therefore his dependence on
the merchants who supplied it.33
This new distribution system had an important impact on the future of
the hotel industry. Previously, demand for lodging facilities had varied
widely depending on factors such as the weather or the buying season. The
tremendous expansion in the number of commercial travellers ("drummers") with
their sample-grips and trunks enabled the hoteliers to achieve a higher
level of certainty, and a reduced level of variability, in the demand for
their services. As one commentator of the time noted:
Travel and the custom on which the hotels depended, had
before that been on a retail scale. They were supported by a
transient and fluctuating traffic. They now at last obtained a
permanent and paying clientage which rose or fell in volume only
with the general prosperity and activity of the country's
business.34
3 3Alfred D. Chandler, Jr., The Visible Hand: The Managerial Revolu-
tion in American Business (Cambridge: Belknap Press, 1977), p. 216.
34 Trade and Travel: Commercial, Financial, Transportation and Hotel
Interests of the United States (New York: Commercial Travelers Club,
1895), p. 155.
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By 1883, the number of drummers were estimated by the Hotel Gazette
to be more than two hundred thousand.35 Their expenses, for railroad fares
36
and hotel bills, were believed to be about one million dollars a day.
The travelling salesman provided a large proportion of the transient trade
for urban commercial hotels and practically all of the patronage in small
37
cities and towns. This new source of demand set off a boom in new hotel
construction across the United States.
The Commercial Hotel at the Turn of the Century
The development of modern mass retailing - through the mail-order
house, the department store, and chain store - began to make inroads in
the consumer goods distribution system in the 1880's. The travelling sales-
man diminished in importance and many of the hotels in smaller towns suffered
accordingly. The advent of the automobile had a further discouraging effect
on hotel operations in villages and small towns. A salesman travelling
from a central point could service a wider area with an automobile and
return to his "base" at night.
3 5Williamson, Op. cit., p. 124.
3 6 Trade and Travel, Op. cit., p.
3 7Norman S. Hayner, Hotel Life (Chapell Hill: University of North Caro-
lina, 1936), p. 94.
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By the turn of the twentieth century, the development of new, larger,
transient hotels was confined mainly to urban areas. Hotels still served
primarily as a site for the consumption of services associated with exchange
activity. The type of exchange activity serviced by the hotel depended
upon the industrial base of the urban area. Some hotels serviced the
exchange needs of factories (with material sellers and finished product
buyers as clients) while others catered to mass merchandising centers.
The Modern Commercial Hotel: Administrative Function
Much of today's capital stock in hotels was put in place during the
period of "Coolidge prosperity," in the late 1920's. Many of the larger,
urban, hotels were built in response to a perceived demand from a relatively
new type of business -- the central-office headed corporation.
As Alfred Chandler notes, during the 1920's the central-office con-
trolled business entity became a central feature of American history. 3 8
3 8Alfred Chandler, p. cit., p. 234.
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These corporations linked together geographically-dispersed establishments
both within and across different industries. In some industries, such as
insurance, the central office coordinated the activities of its numerous
branches in sales, operations and investments. Insurance head offices
became large, centralized bureaucratic enterprises - but limited their
activity to a single industry. For other corporations, diversification
across industries became an explicit strategy for growth during the
1920's. Head-offices administered vast, far-flung industrial empires.
Interest was great, and mergers frequent, in steel, food, petroleum, non-
ferrous metals, machinery and liquor.
The emergence of the central-office headed corporation geographically
separated the administrative function from the production process itself,
and had an important impact on business travel. A new breed of corporate
managers shuttled back and forth between branch plants, regional offices
and the central office, carrying out the administrative duties of the
corporations. Plant managers made periodic trips to head offices to be
instructed on production scheduling matters. Tens of thousands of sales-
men made similar pilgrimages to corporate and regional headquarters for
group sales meetings. Finally, the yearly company convention served
not only as forum for information exchange, but also as a means by which
the entire corporate organism became conscious of itself as an organization.
In the words of Sinclair Lewis' conventioneer Babbitt, they would "zoom
for Zenith." With a sense of corporate identity and loyalty thus instilled,
the "company man" could go back to his local operation, cognizant of the
fact that he was part of a larger corporate "team."
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The growth of the modern corporation has, therefore, been marked by
an increased horizontal (departmentalized) and increased spatial (head
office/branch office) division of labor within its management function.
The initial physical manifestation of this corporate transformation
and growth was the major expansion of downtown office space in the
nation's larger cities during the 1920's. Corporate headquarters generally
have a greater square foot/worker ratio than other types of office opera-
tions. Between 1920 and 1930 downtown office space in the ten largest
cities increased by 3,000 percent, precipitating a real estate boom in
39
each central business district. A secondary response linked particularly
to the increased spatial division of labor within the corporation, was the
construction of thousands of hotel rooms and associated facilities, for
the travelling businessman.
In national centers this trend towards hotel building was most
pronounced. In Chicago, for example, where there had been 11,000 hotel
rooms in 1920, new construction doubled that amount by June, 1921. The
supply of rooms at that point far surpassed demand, and consequently
many hotels ceased to show a profit. Yet, new hotel construction in
Chicago continued - buoyed in part by the new,capital-rich, corporations
(especially insurance companies) looking for investment outlets, and
partially because of a speculative market for hotel bond issues. When
the Stevens Hotel - with 3,000 rooms - opened in 1927, practically the
39
R. D. McKenzie, The Metropolitan Community (New York: McGraw Hill,
1930).
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entire Chicago hotel industry suffered a sharp decline in occupancy and
profits. Still, new hotel construction in Chicago continued.4 0
Regional centers, such as Boston, also witnessed rapid hotel expan-
sion. Boston experienced a 52 percent increase in its supply of hotel
rooms during the 1920's. During the 1927-1929 period alone, some 3,100
hotel rooms were added to the stock. This amounts to fully 25 percent
of all hotel room construction in the city from 1895 to present. 41 Many
of this building occurred adjacent to the new insurance district on
lower Boylston Street.
The fate of many of these hotels serves as a prime example of the
dependence of real estate on location. When they were built in the 1920's,
most urban hotels were either transporation terminal or commercial
destination oriented. Construction occurred either adjacent to major
transportation facilities (primarily railroad stations) or adjoining
important commercial districts. The steep decline in railroad patronage
coupled with inter-and intra-metropolitan shifts in corporate office and
manufacturing location have had direct-and often devestating-effects on
hotel operations. Consequently, the portion of lodging industry receipts
captured by primarily urban hotels (as opposed to suburban and highway
motels and newer motor hotels) declined from 95.9 percent in 1939 to
47.0 percent in 1977,
40 American Hotel Association, The Future Outlook of the Hotel
Industry (New York: 1946).
41
Jason Kelly, Sarah Wermiel, Hotel and Convention Center Demand and
Supply in Boston (Boston: Boston Redevelopment Authority Research Depart-
ment, March 1979).
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The Emergence of the Resort Hotel in New England
New England developed as a favorite vacation spot for the nation's
economic and political elite. By the mid-19th century, Newport, Rhode
Island was second only to Cape May and Long Branch, New Jersey as a
leading beach resort. The popularity of New England resorts in the second
half of the century increased to match the growth of the new middle class
and expanding haute bourgeoisie.
As the noted English historian E. J. Hobsbawn has written: "Industrial
capitalism produced two novel forms of pleasure travel: tourism and summer
holidays for the bourgeoisie and mechanized day trips for the masses..."46
In New England, the wealthiest class had always spent summers in Europe.
By the 1870's, they were building summer mansions along the coast. Day
trips for urban workers came much later.
In New England, the resort industry began in the 1860's when farmers
began taking in summer tourists. Soon "sporting camps" were established,
which were later changed into lodges for vacationers.
The resort boom began in earnest in the 1880's. New rail lines were
opened to both the mountain areas and the New England shore. A sort of
"pleasure periphery" developed outside of the urbanized areas of the region.
Cape Cod and the South Shore section of Massachusetts experienced
especially rapid growth. As the Boston Chamber of Commerce boasted:
The accommodations provided by the railroad for week-end
visitors are particularly extensive, and for the benefit of the
4 6E. J. Hobsbawn, The Age of Capital (New York: New American Library,
1979), p. 224.
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Many of the new hotels construction in the 1920's in national centers
were developed by national hotel corporations. Two of the most prosperous
of these were the Stalter Corporation and the Bowman-Biltmore Corporation.
Statler owed its origins to its early success in building "temporary hotels"
at the sites of International Expositions, such as Chicago and Buffalo, at
the turn of the century. The Bowman-Biltmore chain was created out of the
hotel boom induced by World War I. As Williams notes:
the outbreak of the World War ushered in an era of extra-
ordinary travel to New York and other financial centers, and
the Biltmore rode high on the tide of prosperity. The company
began to acquire other hotels, and the Bowman Biltmore chain
... .sprang into existence.42
Other hotels were built in smaller cities in the 1920's. Often times
these hotels were "community-financed" through a series of prearranged deals
with local property owners and contractors, usually with the local Chamber
of Commerce acting as a catalyst. In Gardner, Massachusetts, for example,
the local Chamber of Commerce raised (through stocks and bonds) $300,000
for the erection of a hotel. The Chamber was also instrumental in raising
funds for hotel projects in Providence, New Bedford, and Lowell. 4 3
The idea for the community-financed hotel usually originated
from two sources. First, some small-town hotel projects were mot-
ivated by a sincere desire for civic improvement on the part of all
concerned.. .Local industries had the feeling that visitors to their
plants were discouraged by the inability to find modern hotel facili-
ties in the town.
On the other hand, however, many small-town hotels were
42Williams, op. cit., p. 164.
43
No title, Commerical Organization Department (Washington: Chamber
of Commerce of the U. S., 1933), p. 16.
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promoted through artificial stimulation of "civic pride" by selfish
interests, seeking to make a personal profit on the construction.
For example, in many instances the idea for a new hotel proved to
have started with the owner of a piece of land where the hotel
"ought" to be built, or the owner of an adjacent piece of property
which would increase in value with the erection of the hotel.
Frequently the new hotel project was initiated by an outside
promoter with an eye toward profiting on the fund-raising for
the project. These vested interests, often with the aid of local
organizations whose support was commandeered through their fears of
otherwise being labeled obstructionists, created an artificial
wave of enthusiasm for the new hotel project, which outshadowed
any calm appeal to business sense.44
Hotels built in this manner were usually too large for local demand,
and were money losers before they were built. Those that did survive
at first were soon crippled by the Depression.
During the 1930's, approximately 80 percent of the nation's hotels
fell into the hands of courts, mortgagors, and receivers. Many hotels went
into bankruptcy before opening their doors. It is estimated that at least
$2.5 billion of original hotel investments were written off the books
during this period. First mortgage bonds of the nation's leading hotels
dropped to around 15 percent of parity.* Institutional lenders, even those
which had been fairly conservative in their investment policy, soon found
themselves emeshed in the hotel operating business. The Metropolitan Life
Insurance Company, for example, became the owner of 138 hotels.4 5
44
American Hotel Association, op. cit.
*
The Sheraton Corporation started as an investment company in the 1930's
buying stocks and bonds at below value. Some of its early acquisitions
happened to be hotels.
4 Ibid., p.
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wealthier class of summer residents, made up principally of Boston
businessmen and their families, exclusive trains of parlor cars,
patronized only by regular subscribers, are run throughout the
season.47
By 1891, the White Mountains of New Hampshire had some 60 resort hotels
with more than 11,000 guest rooms. Spending the summer in the cool
mountain air was considered a pleasant way to escape the heat of the city,
as well as the "social thing to do."
The Berkshire region of Western Massachusetts and the Green Mountains
of Vermont also developed as resort areas; as did the Maine coast and the
southern Connecticut shoreline. The sixteen mile seaside strip of New
Hampshire emerged as a popular summer spot for the middle-class in the
late 1880's.
For the urban working class, summer recreation equalled a Sunday
day trip. In Boston, this generally amounted to a steamer trip or a railway
excursion to nearby Nantasket or Revere Beach. It was estimated in 1910
that approximately one million such day trips per year were made out of
49
Boston to points between Plymouth and Gloucester.
47
Boston Chamber of Commerce, New England (Boston: 1911), p. 286.
4 8 Lundberg, Ok. cit., p. 130.
4 9 Boston Chamber of Commerce, Op. cit., p. 287.
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In the early twentieth century, as production continued to increase,
workers were granted vacation time (usually without pay*). The growth in
automobile ownership allowed vacationers to spend weekends and even weeks
in such far-flung locations as the Berkshires, White Mountains, and Cape
Cod. Tourist courts, the precursor of today's motels sprung up to service
these vacationers. These establishments were typically 15-units and run
by "mom and pop" operators on a seasonal basis. Fifteen units was
considered the limit for these enterprises, because sizes much higher
would require paid help.
Winter ski vacationing began early in the 1930's in locations such as
Warner, New Hampshire and Woodstock, Vermont. Skiing, however, did not
become "big business" until the 1960's. Vermont has effectively reduced
the seasonality of demand in its recreational industry through actively
promoting its ski industry.
*A 1920 survey of 624 firms showed that 85 percent provided paid vaca-
tion to office employees, while only 18 percent gave paid vacations to
factory workers. Workers were exhorted by manufactures to "let your
vacation be an investment in efficiency." See Robert Goldman and John
Wilson, "The Rationalization of Leisure," Politics and Society (No. 2,
1977), pp. 157-187.
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Chapter III: Production and Risk
This chapter discussed both the nature of production and basis
for profitability within the firm, and the risk structure of the
industry as a whole. The chapter begins by discussing the type of
industrial operations: hotels, motels, and motor hotels. These
categories are defined descriptively by the orientation to the auto-
mobile, but are analytically distinguishable by their degree of labor
intensity.
The profit center in all operations is shown to be the rooms
department, and the key to expansion is high occupancy. Profitability
is characterized by high earnings leverage. A small change in
occupancy causes proportionately larger changes in income because of
the fixed cost structure.
The risk structure of the industry is examined in terms of systematic
risk stemming mostly from business cycle fluctuations, and unsystematic
risk which is the celebrated "other" factors category. A risk
profile of various regions and types of operations is developed.
Finally, strategies aimed at reducing risk are discussed.
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In 1972, the hotel-motel industry in New England consisted of some
3700 establishments ranging in size from 1500 rooms to less than ten units.
Many firms were seasonal in operation, and approximately 28 percent had no
payroll whatsoever. Gross revenue per'establishment varied from less than
$1,000 to almost $35 million per year. Ownership and control rested with
both "mom and pop" type operations and multi-billion dollar conglomerates.
To summarize, the industry is quite diverse with respect to ownership,
management, and extent of operations. Common themes and discernable indus-
trial structure are, however, readily observable.
In our analysis, the structure of the industry can be arrayed hier-
archically within three dimensions ordered according to the amount on
predictability of revenues, and total employment per establishment:
ONWERSHIP/MANAGEMENT MARKET LOCATION
1. Corporate owned, 1. Convention/ 1. City-Airport
leased, or managed. group business
2. Franchised 2. Business 2. Suburban
traveller.
3. Single owner/ 3. Tourist 3. Sea and Ski
operator (ma & pop)
4. Highway
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This descriptive hierarchy should be properly considered as an outcome of
certain economic and political forces. It will be the purpose of this
thesis to explicate the structure and dynamic of these forces.
The objectives of this chapter will be twofold. First, we will
present an overview of hotel-motel operations. This will consist of a
discussion of the types of establishments, and a depiction of how money is
made in the industry. The second objective of the chapter will be to
examine the components of the investment decision from the standpoint of
risk structure and risk-reduction strategies.
Types of Operations
This case study will examine three establishment types within the
lodging industry: hotel, motels (including tourist courts), and motor
hotels. Hotels, motels and motor hotels are establishments primary engaged
in supplying transient lodging, food, recreational facilities, and meeting
space to the general public. These three groupings constitute standard
Industrial Classification 701 as determined by the Office of Management
and Budget. Excluded from consideration in this study are private member-
ship hotels, residential hotels, rooming houses, and camps and trailering
parks (S. I. C. 702, S. I. C. 703, S. I. C. 704).
Hotels, motels and motor hotels represent three qualitatively different
types of operation. Table 1 presents a comparison of hotels, motels, and
motor hotels on the national level for the year 1972. Table 2 displays
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Table 1
Comparison of Hotels, Motels, and Motor Hotels
1972
Hotel
Basis of Comparison
Type of Establishmentl
Motel Motor
Hotel
Size
Percentage of establishments with:
100 and over units
50-99 units
25-49 units
5-24 units
Average Number of Units
Receipts
Average receipts/room
Average receipts/establishment
Age
Percentage of establishments
2
commencing operations:
Before 1942
1942-1954
1955-1963
1964-1972
Facilities
Percentage of establishments
2
with:
Free off-street parking
Restaurant
Public Meeting Room
Labor
Average rooms/worker
Average receipts/worker
Average payroll/receipts
Establishments with payroll only.
2
Hotels with 25 guestrooms or more.
16.6
16.6
35.5
31.3
100.0
8.1
11.5
26.3
54.1
100.0
70.3 37.3
35.3
20.4
22.2
22.1
100.0
87.8
$6,282 $3,727 $5,987
(000) $ 441.4 $ 139.0 $ 526.0
50.8
13.8
14.8
20.7
100.0
74.1
62.5
50.3
2
2.11
$13,672
34.21
10.1
28.1
36.5
25.4
100.0
97.9
28.8
19.0
8.0
8.1
29.3
54.6
100.0
98.9
80.1
70.5
3.79 2.26
$14,116 $13,558
24.20 27.79
Source: Census of Selected Service Industries, 1972.
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Table 2
Distribution of Establishments, Rooms, Receipts
and Employment - by Establishment Type and Size
1972
Establishment Percent of Total
Types Size (# rooms) Establishments :-Rooms Receipts Employment
All 300 and over 1.5 16.1 31.4 28.7
100-299 10.4 31.6 36.8 37.6
50-99 13.4 18.7 14.7 16.1
25-49 28.5 19.7 10.7 11.3
Less than 2 46.2 14.1 6.3 6.3
Total 100.0 100.2* 99.9 100.0
Hotels 300 and over 1.1 12.5 26.5 23.4
100-299 3.3 10.6 12.8 14.0
50-99 4.4 6.0 4.3 5.4
25-49 9.3 6.1 2.7 3.6
Less than 25 8.2 2.6 1.9 1.9
Sub Total 26.3 37.8 48.2 48.3
Motels 300 and over 0.2 2.1 2.5 2.5
100-299 5.3 15.2 16.4 15.7
50-99 7.8 10.7 8.6 8.9
25-49 17.8 12.7 7.3 7.1
Less than 25 36.7 11.1 4.3 4.3
Sub Total 67.8 51.8 39.1 38.5
Motor Hotels 300 and over 0.2 1.5 2.4 2.2
100-299 1.8 5.9 7.5 7.9
50-99 1.2 1.7 1.8 1.9
25-49 1.3 0.9 0.6 0.7
Less than 25 1.3 0.4 0.1 0.1
Sub Total 100.0 10.4 12.4 12.8
Grand Total 100.0 100.0 99.7* 99.6*
*Differs from 100.0 due to rounding. Establishments with payroll only
Source: Census of Selected Service Industries, 1972.
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the distribution of all establishments, rooms, receipts, and employment
by establishment type and size for the same year.
As Table 1 illustrates, hotels are generally older, have the highest
average receipts per room, and are the most labor intensive. Over half
of all hotels were constructed prior to 1942. The average room collected
$6,282 in 1972, of which 34.2 percent went to payroll.
Motels, on average, are smaller, newer, are less labor intensive,
and have a much lower receipts per room. Most motels were built during
the 1955-1963 period, over half of all establishments contained fewer than
25 guestrooms, and only 24.2 percent of the average $3,727 per room revenue
went towards payroll costs. There was an average of 3.79 rooms per motel
worker. This is because hotels provided more services (i.e. bellmen, eleva-
tor operators), and because hotels generally included more facilities.
Twice as many hotels had restaurants (62.5% of hotels versus 28.8% of
motels); and, hotels were much more likely to have public meeting rooms
(50.3% of hotels versus 19.0% of motels). As its name implies, the motel
is much more oriented towards the motoring public, and is more likely to
provide off-street parking.
Motor hotels are a hybrid of motels and hotels. These establishments
are, on average, newer than hotels (although many are converted hotels),
and are slightly larger. Motor hotels almost always provide "free" parking,
and usually have restaurant and meeting room facilities as well. Yet despite
these additional facilities, motor hotels are somewhat less labor intensive
than hotels (2.26 rooms per employee and 27.8 percent of receipts to pay-
roll). This is because motor hotels generally offer fewer "extras" such as
room and bell service, porters, elevator operators, and switchboard personnel;
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or, because these services have been automated. This latter reason is
probably a reflection of the relative newness of many of the motor hotels
(in 1972 over half of these establishments had been built during the pre-
vious eight years).
"Motor inns" and "motor lodges" are variously categorized as motels
or motor hotels depending upon whether they are multi-storied or offer
hotel-type facilities. However, since the Census Bureau relies heavily
on self-designation, the nominal categorizations "hotel," "motel," and
"motor hotel" should not be overemphasized, especially other than in the
aggregate level.
In the aggregate, however, hotels, motels, and motor hotels are most
cearly distinguishable by their degree of labor intensity. Table 3
depicts the payroll/receipts ratios* of the three types of operations
across five different size categories. As the data shows, hotels consistent-
ly have the highest payroll/receipts ratio. Motels are between 74.1% and
79.8% as labor intensive as hotels; while motor hotels range between 81.0%
and 88.0% of the hotel ratio.
The long term trend in the industry has been towards the less labor
intensive motel-type operation. Between 1939 and 1977, motels and motor
hotels increased their share of the lodging market from 4.1% to 53.0%. As
Table 5 illustrates, hotels and motels (and motor hotels) are competing
modes of operation within the industry. The growth of one segment is
*
Payroll/receipts is a better indicator than rooms/employee in that
it shows less distortion because of the influence of part time employees.
In addition, the total payroll and total receipt figures are collected on
a yearly basis, while the total employment figure represents only those
employees working the week of March 12th and is therefore susceptible to
the distortions of seasonality.
45 -
Table 3
Labor Intensity of Hotels, Motels, Motor Hotels, 1972;
By Establishment Class
Payroll/Receipt Ratio
Size (# rooms)
300 +
100-299
50-99
25-49
Less than 25
Hotels
35.3
33.7
32.6
28.5
22.5
Motels
26.2
26.2
26.0
21.4
16.7
Motor Hotels
28.6
28.2
27.2
23.5
19.8
Source: Census of Selected Service Industries, 1972.
Table 3a
Relative Labor Intensity: Hotels, Motels, Motor Hotels, 1972:
By Establishment Size Class
Percent of Hotel Payroll/Receipt Ratio
Size Class
(# rooms)
300 +
100-299
50-99
25-49
Less than 25
Hotels
100.0
100.0
100.0
100.0
100.0
Motels
74.2
77.7
79.8
75.1
74.2
Motor Hotels
81.0
83.7
83.4
82.4
88.0
Source: Census of Selected Service Industries, 1972.
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Table 4
Industry Receipts by Type of Establishment
1939-1977 ($1972)
Hotel
Amount ($Mil's)
$2,956.2
4,892.8
4,203.7
4,352.0
4,192.1
4,851.8
4,794.3
5,804.6
Percent
95.9%
91.9
84.0
76.7
64.4
58.5
47.5
47.0
Source: Census of Selected Service
Domestic Commerce, 1977.
Motel, Motor Hotel
Amount ($Mil's) Percent
$ 125.7 4.1%
435.8 8.1
869.0 16.0
1,324.6 23.3
2,317.2 35.6
3,438.6 42.5
5,293.5 52.5
6,519.6 53.0
Industries, 1939-1972, Bureau of
Table 5
Percent Change in Receipts, by
Type of Establishment, 1948-1977
Motel, Motor
+99.4
+52.4
+74.9
+48.4
+53.9
+23.2
Hotel
correlation
coeffi cient=
(-.93)
source: See
Table 4
Year
1939
1948
1954
1958
1963
1967
1972
1977
Period
1948-54
1954-58
1958-63
1963-67
1967-72
1972-77
Hotel
-14.1%
+3.5
-3.7
+15.7
-1.2
+21.1
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strongly negatively correlated (-.93) with that of the other. Between
1939 and 1972 the development trend clearly favored motel-type operations.
However, this tendency has moderated during recent years. In 1977, hotels
achieved their highest level of receipts, and for the first time since
1939, the growth rate (1972-1977) in hotel receipts nearly matched that
of motels.
The relative importance of hotels, motels and motor hotels during 1972
is displayed in Table 2 . Despite the trend towards smaller motels, the
"grand hotel" remains a dominating force in the industry. During 1972,
hotels of over 300 rooms constituted only 1.1% of all establishments;
however, they accounted for 12.5% of all rooms, 26.5% of all receipts, and
23.4% of total employment. By way of contrast, motels of less than 25 rooms
are the largest single grouping (36.7% of all establishments), but consti-
tuted only 11.1% of total rooms, 4.3% of receipts, and 4.3% of employment.
Motor hotels are most important (in terms of revenues, employment, and
receipts) in the 100-299 room size range.
Among all establishments, 68.2% of all industry revenue is concentra-
ted among those enterprises containing over 100 guestrooms, though large
operations account for only 11.9% of all establishments and 47.7% of all
rooms. These large revenue generators have been the primary target for
chain expansion - through both new construction and the reorganization of
existing operations. This phenomenon will be treated in greater detail
in Chapter 4
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Operations and Profitability
Hotel-motel entrepreneurs and investors are in the business to make
a profit. The meaning of "profitability" may vary depending upon the
interests of one of several classes of actors. Some investors are interest-
ed in long term appreciation and tax benefits, while others are concerned
exclusively with generating a positive cash flow. Regardless of individual
interest, however, the enterprise must be capable of producing a cash flow
large enough to cover undistributed operating expenses, taxes, and any fixed
capital changes. Residual cash can then be distributed to the owners or
reinvested in the enterprise.
Table 6 illustrates the results of operations for 1977 for 800 hotels
and motels sampled by the industry accounting firm Harris, Kerr, Forster
and Company. As can be readily observed, the key profit center is the
rooms department. The rooms department contributed 82.6% of all operating
income, and had a "profit rate" (operating income/department revenues) of
72.4%. In contrast, the food and beverage department contributed 13.8%
of total operating income (on 35.9% of total revenue) and had a department
"profit rate" of 19.7%.
The food and beverage departments is much more labor intensive than
rooms department. In 1977, 41.0% of all departmental revenue in food and
beverage went to payroll and related costs.* In comparison, only 19.1%
of all rooms department revenue went to labor.
Holding the mix of hotels and motels with and without resturants
constant, Harris, Kerr, Forster and Company reports that restaurant
*These include vacation, employees meals, payroll taxes, and employee
benefits.
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patronage in the industry has pursued a downward trend since 1957. Accord-
ing to the accounting firm, "the total number of guest food covers served
during 1977 equalled but 78 percent of the base year's [1957] total."1
Thus, the long term trend, both among and within different types of opera-
tions, has been away from the more labor intensive forms of production.
It is not surprising, therefore, to find that firms wishing to develop
their markets and accumulate capital* are more likely to expand their rooms
department than their restaurant operation. Once the decision is made to
respond to the possibilities for heightened profitability inherent in accum-
ualtion and market power, key issues regarding timing and attracting re-
sources must be resolved.
The key to expansion is usually a high level of occupancy (capacity
utilization). Higher levels of occupancy mean greater activity in the
main profit center (rooms), and affords the possibility to raise room
rates. Continued high occupancy and room rates suggest that the expansion
of productive capacity and broadening of the base for heightened accumula-
tion and profitability may be in order.
Industry accounting data and information from field interviews indicate
that expansion should be preceeded by a demonstration of strong performance
(steady occupancy at maximum room rates) , with the per cent occupancy in
the mid-eighties. Theoretically, this is the optional moment for expansion,
assuming continued lodging industry growth in the area. The immediate
1 Trade in the Hotel-Motel Business, 1978 Edition (New York: Harris,
Kerr, Forster and Company, 1978).
*Not all enterprises are concerned with accumulation. Many independents
are in business to supplement their income and provide for their own sub-
sistence.
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Table 6
Results of Operations, 1977
Percent of Total Revenue
Departmental Revenues and
Expenses
Rooms Department
Revenue 57.0
Expenses 15.7
Operating Income 41.3
Food and Beverage Department
Revenue 35.9
Expenses 29.0
Operating Income 6.9
Telephone Department
Revenue 2.6
Expenses 3.7
Operating Income (1-1)*
Other (Operating Dept. Rentals,
and Other Income)
Revenue 4.5
Expenses 1.6
Operating Income 2.9
Total Operated Department's Income 50.0
Undistributed Operating Expenses 24.5
Income Before Fixed Charges 25.5
Property Taxes & Insurance 4.3
Income Before Other Fixed Charges1  21.2
*Loss
1
Income before deducting Depreciation, Rent, Interest, Amortization, and
Income Taxes.
Source: Trends in the Hotel-Motel Business, 1978 Edition (New York:
Harris, Kerr, Forster, and Co., 1978).
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effect of expansion may be to lower occupancy to near the break-even point.
However, as occupancy rises profits will increase percentage wise much faster
than change in the volume of operation. This is because fixed capital charges
are static and operating costs are only mildly variable therefore a boost
in sales will result in a relatively small additional cost and a proportion-
ately large additional profit. This is known as "earnings leverage.
For example, a firm moving from 65% to 75% occupancy will gen-
erate 15.4% more sales revenue -- but net income before taxes will increase
by 389%.2 Moreover, as the firm increases its occupancy rate, its profit margin
will increase as well. In 1977, the break-even point for establishments
sampled by the accounting firm Laventhol and Horwath was 62.4%. Data
show that as occupancy rises so does the profit margin: 3
Occupancy Profit Margin
(Net Income Before Taxes/
Total Revenue)
62.4% 0.0%
65.0% 1.8%
75.0% 7.6%
85.0% 12.0%
95.0% 15.5%
Just as earnings leverage produces a widening profit margin on the upside,
so too can it result in some fairly dramatic losses when business is on the
2 Laventhol and Horwarth, U. S. Lodging Industry, 1978 Edition (Phila-
delphia, 1978).
3 Ibid.
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decline and occupancy rates are falling:4
Occupancy Profit Margin
62.4% 0.0%
55.0% -6.1%
50.0% -11.3%
45.0% -17.5%
40.0% -25.4%
Restaurant and bar earnings suffer severely during business
declines. This is becausepayroll is the largest dining room cost, and a
minimum crew must be maintained regardless of business volume. As one
interviewee indicated, "Sometimes there are more staff than customers
present." During the depression, the owner of a New York hotel is said to
have remarked: "If I could go into the dining room and pay every prospective
diner a dollar not to eat here I could save money."5 The same principle
of earnings leverage also applies to the operation of the bar and entertain-
ment room.
Risk
Those firms which resort to rental or debt financing (as most do) in
order to expand productive capacity are boosting potential profitability,
but are also increasing their downside risk. In 1977, interest and rental
expenses accounted for 12.6% of total sales among those firms sampled by
Laventhol and Horwath. This additional burden of fixed capital charges
4 Ibid.
5American Hotel Association, The Future Outlook of the Hotel Industry
(New York: 1946).
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has the effect of raising the break-even occupancy point and making the
enterprise more vulnerable to variations in demand and occupancy. This
variability in demand is usually associated with economic forces affecting
real income, business activity, or travel. In addition, changes in climatic
conditions can have a devastating effect on recreationally-oriented lodging
operations.
Earnings leverage and high fixed costs are the important supply-related
factors influencing risk. In order to better understand demand-side risk
it is necessary to examine the two major components of demand -- recreation
and business -- and see how they relate to cyclicality in the economy.
Revenues in the lodging industry are fairly evenly divided between those
derived from recreational travel and business travel, with business holding
a slight (though declining) edge. According to the American Hotel and
Motel Association, in 1975 business (including convention) guests accounted
for 54 per cent of all industry revenues, though they consumed only 35 per
cent of total room nights.6 Table 7 lists the ten leading industrial
purchasers of hotel-motel services. Clearly, salespersons and others
involved in exchange activity are the major commercial consumers, though
individuals connected with administrative functions (i.e., bank examiners,
members of professional organizations) and production (i.e., construction
workers, actors) are also highly represented.
6 Cited in U. S. Industrial Outlook, 1978 (Washington: GPO, 1978),
p. 456.
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Table 7
Ten Major Industrial Purchasers of Overnight Accomodations
Rank Industry
1. Wholesale trade
2. Finance and insurance
3. Miscellaneous professional
services
4. New construction
5. Retail trade
6. Health-care services
7. Food processors
8. Motion picture production,
amusement, recreation
services, and commercial
sports
9. Nonprofit organizations
10. Miscellaneous business
services
Typical
Representatives
Salesmen for industrial products
Agents, brokers; bank examiners
Lawyers; accountants; engineers
Contractors; buyers, workers
Buyers; salesmen
Doctors; patients; salesmen of medical
equipment and pharmaceuticals
Buyers; salesmen to the trade
Production companies; artists and enter-
tainers; professional teams
Members of business and professional
associations
Agents and employees of advertising
companies; credit and computer services;
news syndicates
Source: U. S. Department of Commerce, "Input-Output Structure of the U. S.
Economy: 1967," cited in Clarence Peters, "Pre-Opening Market
Analysis for Hotels," Cornell Hotel and Restaurant Administration
Quarterly (May, 1978), p. 17.
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Both recreational and business segments of demand are highly sensitive
to shifts in the state of the economy. Figure shows the close correlation
between percentage changes in occupancy rates (occupancyt - occupancyt-l/
occupancyt) for the industry as a whole and changes in GNP (correlation
coefficient = .81). Figure shows the change in income derived from the
lodging industry as compared to the overall growth in national income for
the 1958-1977 period. Data show that the change in income associated with
the lodging industry moved procyclically throughout the timespan with the
exception of the 1971 and 1975 periods.
The counter-cyclical decline in lodging industrial income (as measured
by both revenues and value addedl in 1971 probably was the result of the
continuing fall in real income being experienced by families*, and a failure
to recover the consumer confidence evidenced in the late 1960's. The pick-
up in business-related demand failed to adequately off-set the fall-off in
recreational demand and the industry suffered a decline.
Industrial performance during 1975, when compared to 1971, suggests an
important market shift. Durng the late period, lodging industrial income
increased (though not to its 1973 level) despite the continuation of both the
business recession and a decline in real family income. Moreover, evidence
indicates that this revenue growth was sustained by the recreational segment,
which increased its market share dramatically from 28% to 46%. This shift re-
flected not only a sharp fall-off in business and convention demand, but also
a change in consumer psychology. Consumers adopted a more "inflationary"
(buy now) attitude toward the purchase of recreational services. Personal
7Ibid.
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Figure 1
Percent Change From Previous Year:
GNP and Hotel-Motel Occupancy Rate
1963-1977
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Figure 2
Trend in Lodging Industry Relative to National
Income at Factor Costs. : 1958-1977 (billions of $1972)
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consumption expenditures increased by 1.89% during 1975 even though real
family income fell by 2.8%.8 Vacation spending, postponed during the 1974
recession and energy "crisis," became a priority item for consumers in 1975
and the lodging industry -- particularly its recreational segment -- bene-
fitted accordingly. Total industry revenue increased by 1.72%. The move-
ment of industry revenue in both 1971 and 1975 would seem to suggest that
the recreational segment is relatively less sensitive to cyclicality than
the commercial segment. While the level of disposable personal income
(which increased on a per capita basis by 1.0% in 1975) is a key determinant
of recreational lodging demand, other factors (i.e., transporation develop-
ment, travel pattern changes, length of average work week, weather) also
play a strong role.
"Systematic" and "Unsystematic" Risk
Writing in the Cornell Hotel and Restaurant Administration Quarterly,
Arbel and Grier present an analysis of the hotel motel industry which yields
9
some useful insights regarding risk structure. Following Sharpe's methodo-
logy, Arbel and Grier differentiate between two components of total risk:
"systematic risk" and "unsystematic risk." Systematic risk they define as:
8
Economic Report of the President, 1978 (Washington: GPO, 1978), Tables
B-2, B-22, B-25.
9 William F. Sharpe, "A Simplified Model for Portfolio Analysis," Manage-
ment Science (January, 1963) , pp. 227-293.
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In their empirical study, Arbel and Grier estimated the amount of
systematic risk for different regions- and categories of operation. The
authors also assigned proportionate weights to systematic and unsystematic
risk for each subset. They did this by studying hotel-motel operations
for the years 1955-1976, and using variance in occupancy rates as the
measure of total risk.
Arbel and Grier acknowledge that rate of occupancy is not a substitute
for earnings, and that two establishments with the same occupancy rate
can have quite different financial results (depending on differences in
fixed capital costs, variable cost structure, etc.). However, they assert
that occupancy rates tend to move with earnings. To evaluate this assertion,
the correlation between the percentage change in occupancy rates and the
percentage change in the proportion of total revenue going to fixed
capital charges and profit was calculated to be .92*. This partially
substantiates the use of occupancy rate variability as a valid measure of
riisk, though change in return on investment remains the ideal -- albeit
unavailable -- indicator.
Arbel and Grier calculated the variance in occupancy rates for 50
hotel-motel subsets based on cross -sectional averages for each of the 21
years in the study period. The average annual national occupancy rate for
*
This is based on data for the years 1963-1977 contained in Trends in
the Hotel-Motel Business, 1978 Edition (New York: Harris, Kerr, Forster
and Company, 1978). The measure "proportion of total revenue going to fixed
costs" begs the basic question "proportion of what?." But with actual
revenue figures lacking, this measure is meaningful at the aggregate level.
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the industry as a whole was based on a sample of 1,000 establishments,
representing all relevant subsets. The relationship between the occupancy
level of industry as a whole and the relevant subset was then determined
by regressing one against the other over the historical period.*
Source: Arbel and Grier, op. cit.
*The equation is:
(1) OR. =a.+O.OR +yjt 3 J -mt+*jt
where
OR . = occupancy rate for hotel subset j in period tJt
OR = occupancy rate for the hotel industry as a whole during
period t
ymt = residual occupancy rate for hotel subset j during period
t
a. = intercept of the best linear fit between hotel subset j's
observed occupancy rate and the hotel industry's observed
occupancy rate
S. = slope of the best linear fit between hotel subset j's
observed occupancy rate and the hotel industry's observed
occupancy rate
To examine the risk of occupancy rate for hotel subset j, the variance
of both sides is taken, yielding:
(2) Var (OR.) = 2 Var (OR ) + Var (P)
J J m j
where
Var (OR.) = measure of total riskJ
2 Var (ORm) = measure of systematic risk
Var ( ) )= measure of unsystematic risk
Durbin-Watson test revealed significant serial correlation, implying that
better estimates can be derived by adjusting for the serial correlation cause
by a common trend in the data. As a result Equation (1) was estimated with
first differences rather than absolute values.
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regions ranges between a variance of 4.55 and 13.23. However, the total
variance Crisk) for a portfolio which includes all transient hotels in all
regions is only 3.99. The total "market risk," theoretically achievable
through diversification for multi-property operators, is less than the
risk associated with any given region.
Table 8b shows the apportionment of total variance attributable to
systematic risk (i.e. the national trend) and unsystematic risk (i.e.
"other factors"). The results indicate that the relative mix of systematic-
unsystematic risk is distributed unevenly among regions and different cate-
gories of operation. These findings again serve to support the contention
that diversification tends to reduce the portion of unsystematic risk. For
example, a fully diversified portfolio of transient hotels might be able
to reduce its portion of unsystematic risk to eight per cent.
Table 8 c illustrates the relative volatility of the systematic
portion of risk faced by different regions and categories of operation.
Beta values of less than one indicate that the subset will vary less than
the industry overall, while betas greater than one indicate greater volatil-
ity. Since we know that the per centage change in the national occupancy
rate is highly correlated with changes in GNP (see Figure ), we can infer
that the major factor influencing the portion of systematic risk is the
business cycle. The data in Tables a, b, c would seem to confirm this
notion and, in addition, provide a rough indication of the sensitivity of
different types of operations in different regions to national business
trends (degree of procyclicality).
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Table 8a
Total Risk in Terms of Variance in Occupancy Rates
Motels
With
Restaurants
Motels
Without
Restaurants
All Regions
New England &
Middle Atlantic
North Central
South Atlantic
South Central
Mountain &
Pacific
3.50
5.47
2.76
8.64
3.85
4.52
3.99
7.16
5.39
13.23
5.12
4.55
5.84
9.31
3.75
15.25
7.89
10.83
5.34
13.10
9.37
20.02
5.18
7.74
Source: Avner Arbel and Paul Grier, "The Risk Structure of the Hotel
Industry," Cornell Hotel and Restaurant Administration Quarterly
(November, 1978), p. 16.
Table 8 b
Systematic and Unsystematic Risk as a Per Centage of Total Risk
All Transient Motels Motels
Hotels Hotels With Without
Restaurants Restaurants
All Regions
New England &
Middle Atlantic
North Central
South Atlantic
South Central
Mountain &
Pacific
SR UR
79 21
78 22
62 38
58 42
30 70
78 22
SR UR SR UR
92 8 53 47
67 33
71 29
31 69
30 70
56 44
63
25
43
17
37
75*
57
83*
78 22
SR UR
35 65
18
16
53
17
82
84
47
83
0 100*
*Not significantly different from 0 at 5% confidence level.
Source: See Table 8 a.
All
Hotels-
Motels
Transient
Hotels
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All Regions
Table 8 c
Index of Systematic Risk (a) and t Statistics
Transient Hotels Motels w/Restaurants Motels w/o Restaurants
S (t) S (t) S (t)
1.03 (14.39) 0.91 (4.25) 0.70 ( 2.91)
New England &
Middle Atlantic
North Central
South Atlantic
South Central
Mountain &
Pacific
1.18
1.06
1.09
0.66
( 6.04)
6.68)
2.85)
( 2.75)
1.14
0.46
1.20
0.55
0.86 ( 4.76) 1.37
(4.31)
(1.91) *
(2.85)
(1.52) *
0.71
0.57
1.53
0.44
( 2.54)
2.42)
( 3.49)
( 2.47)
(6.31) -0.04 (-0.09)*
*
Not significantly different from o at 5% confidence level.
Source: See Table 8 a.
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As the author notes:
since the variance of the national occupancy rate is given,
the systematic risk will vary among individual hotels or regional
groups only through differences in the betas of the hotels.
Beta...is an index of the relative volatility of the hotel. A
hotel that is less volatile than the hotel industry as a whole
will have a beta that is less than one; one more volatile than
the industry overall will have a beta greater than one. The
beta for the hotel industry as a whole is, of course, equal
to one. 12
The residuals of the regression equation (variance not explainable in
terms of the independent variable, which is the trend in occupancy rates
for the hotel industry as a whole) constitute the unsystematic risk. Thus,
the r2 for any given subgroup would indicate the per centage of total risk
which is systematic (explainable by the independent variable), and the
difference between r2 and unity would equal the per centage of unsystematic
risk. To be sure, this is very much a "first-cut" type of analysis. How-
ever, the data does allow us to make some important observations concerning
inter-regional and cross-category differences in the variability of occupancy
rates, and the influence of diversificaton.
The results of Arbel and Grier's analysis on a regional basis is
presented in Table 8a. The data show that there are substantial differences
in total risk among different regions and types of operations. The data
also show that, with few exceptions, total risk can be reduced within regions
by diversifying across categories, and within categories by diversifying
across regions. Thus, for example, total risk for transient hotel within
12
Arbel and Grier, cp. cit., p. 17.
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As might be expected, transient hotels as a group display the highest
portion of systematic risk (92 per cent) on both intra-regional and inter-
regional levels. This indicates that almost all of the variance experienced
by this industry grouping can be attributed to changes in occupancy levels
experienced by the industry as a whole (and, by inference, changes in the
national economy). This makes sense, since one would expect transient
hotels, which are usually oriented towards business demand, to exhibit the
greatest amount of responsiveness to national economic trends.
The beta value for transient hotels (1.03) indicates that the degree
of procyclicality for this group nearly matches that of the industry as
a whole. Positive betas for all subsets mean that the systematic risk
for all relevent subgroups is procyclical. Variation around a value of
one tells whether the systematic risk exhibited by the industry group is
more or less procyclical than the industry as a whole.
For example, findings show that motels without restaurants have a
much lower beta (.70), indicating less systematic risk for this type of
operation. However, as Arbel and Grier point out:
Although a hotel or regional group with a beta of less
than one has less systematic risk than the industry as a
whole, it does not necessarily have less total risk because,
if its unsystematic risk is high, its total risk may be above
that of the hotel industry as a whole.13
13 Ibid.
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the part of total variability of returns caused by factors
that simultaneously affect the returns of the hotel industry as
a whole. These factors are typically related to changes in general
economic conditions, the social environment, and the relative compe-
titiveness of the industry. All hotels will be affected to a certain
extent by systematic risk.10
"Unsystematic risk" the authors categorize as:
the portion of total risk that is unique to a particular hotel
or hotel category. It is affected by such individualistic factors
as management performance, local competition, and shifts in consumer
preferences. It can also be affected by a particular hotel's
financial structure and operating leverage, as well as its sensi-
itivity to inflation. Sometimes unsystematic risk is common to
a particular subindustry and not to others.ll
Systematic risk can never be eliminated totally, but can be reduced
somewhat through diversification across regions and different types of
operations. Unsystematic risk, on the other hand, can be neutralized to
varying degrees by assembling an asset mix consisting of many different types
of operations in different regions. Theoretically, this type of risk can be
reduced to zero if the holder can assemble the "market portfolio" (e.g. total
unsystematic risk [random error] averages to zero).
Only multi-property owners can reduce systematic risk through diver-
sification, or move towards eliminating unsystematic risk. Single-property
owners and operators can only act to reduce the unsystematic risk of their
own operations -- they have very little control over systematic risk. This
implies a certain economy of scale for the large national chain operations.
1 0 Avner Arbel and Paul Grier, "The Risk Structure of the Hotel Industry,"
Cornell Hotel and Restaurant Administration Quarterly (November, 1978), p.
16.
11
Ibid., p. 17.
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Thus, even though the beta for motels without restaurants is low, the fact
that unsystematic risk is high (65%) means that the total risk for this
category (5.34) remains higher than that of all hotels-motels (3.50).
This also makes good sense, since this type of operation caters mainly to
recreational travellers, and: (1) disposable personal income and personal
consumption expenditures, two primary determinants of recreational demand,
vary less on a year to year basis than total GPN (thus yielding a lower
beta); and (2) occupancy levels for this type of establishment would tend to
be influenced more by local and firm-specific factors, such as the interplay
between regional weather patterns and seasonality (thus yielding a higher
proportion of unsystematic risk).
Looking at the distribution of systematic and unsystematic risk on an
inter-regional basis, it is noteworthy that among all regional groups, the
New England and Middle Atlantic region: (1) has the highest total un-
systematic risk for motels without restaurants; and (2) has the highest
total systematic risk for transient hotels. The former observation reflects,
no doubt, the fact that the region displays the highest level of seasonality.
Motels without restaurants in this region have a relatively low portion of
variance in occupancy explainable in terms of the national ("systematic")
occupancy rate (18%), and a relatively high total variance (13.10). Con-
sequently, the amount of unsystematic risk exhibited by these establishments
(10.74) is the highest of any regional group.
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Conversely, transient hotels in this region have a relatively high
portion of variance in occupancy attributable to the national trend (67%),
and a fairly high amount of total variance (7.16). As a result, the total
amount of systematic risk for this regional group (4.80) is higher than that
of any other region surveyed. Contributing to this state of affairs is
the fact that transient hotels in the New England and Middle Atlantic region
exhibit the highest degree of procyclicality (beta value of 1.18) of
any regions.
Among all establishment types in the New England and Middle Atlantic
region, only motels with restaurants exhibit moderate levels of total risk,
unsystematic risk, and systematic risk; and, only this group displays a
degree of procyclicality approximating the industry as a whole. This is
because these establishments often tend to be multi-market (mixing business
and recreational demand), and are located near suburban industrial parks
(which, otsensibly, provide a more stable business demand), or are sited
at major highway interchanges (with heavier and more regular vacation
travel demand).
Risk Reduction Strategies
"He characterized himself as a man who 'does not like surprises --
not bad ones....'
Description of Howard B. Johnson, New York Times
August 6, 1979.
Steady growth during the 1958-1969 period, made possible in part by
"high volume and cheap labor," had the effect of diverting much of the
lodging industry from the task of developing strategies to lessen the
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risk inherent in high earnings leverage and cyclical sensitivity. However,
variability in demand experienced in the first half of the 1970's -- and
during the 1973-1975 recession in particular -- has forced the industry to
become increasingly concerned about adopting measures aimed at sheltering
business income from economic instability and higher levels of risk. These
strategies may be grouped into four categories:
(1) Diversification. This stragegy, mentioned in the previous section,
is available only to multi-establishment operators. In 1972, multi-establish-
ment companies accounted for 2.4% of all firms, 7.5% of all establishments,
14
and 43.5% of all receipts. The larger multi-establishment firms have all
achieved regional diversification, but their location decisions are also
tempered by considerations of market growth. New England is considered a
"low growth" region: between 1958 and 1972, regional receipts increased
by only 52.7%, compared to a national average of 74.1%. In 1972, New
England had 6.5 per cent of all establishments with payroll but only 4.3
per cent of all chain properties. By 1977, New England's share of total
chain properties had declined to 3.6 per cent.1 5
Some multi-establishment companies also diversify across
1 4 Census of Selected Service Industries 1972, General Report On
Industrial Organization, Table 7.
1 5 Chain Lodging Analysis, various years, American Hotel & Motel Asso-
ciation (New York) In addition, the risk profile for New England is such
that its marginal contribution to the reduction of total risk is less than
that of other regions.
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different types of operations*, intra-regional locations Ci.e. suburban,
center city, and highway), and rate groups (i.e., budget, luxury). This
last strategy has been curtailed during recent years as franchise holders
maintained that this constituted unfair competition from their own parent
chain corporation.
(2) Creaming. This strategy is aimed at capturing the more "stable"
portion of the recreational and business market. In this manner, firms
seek to minimize their exposure to unsystematic risk.
A good example of this strategy in operation is the convention hotel.
A hotel with a strong convention demand can enter a new year with as many
as 40% of its total room-nights pre-booked. This depends, of course, on
the existence of a convention facility within close proximity. In
addition, it is important that the convention facility be capable of
attracting a sufficient number of national as opposed to regional conven-
tions (it is estimated that nights spent by out-of-towners is about double
for national conventions).
Even with a strong convention demand, these hotels are not immune to
fluctuations in occupancy. The convention-related market itself tends to
move with the overall trend in occupancy and the business cycle. Analysis was
done on the trends in rooms assigned for major Boston conventions by the Greater
Boston Convention and Tourist Bureau for the years 1966-1976.
*
For example, Laurence Geller, senior vice president for development
at Holiday Inns, characterizes his company as "not restricted to a single
kind of property...We have many different product lines, and we are
seeking opportunities in all those lines." Holiday Inns has an interest
in "resorts, center city hotels, airports, suburban inns -- whatever the
type of property..." "Eric Bernard leads Holiday Inns into the 80's,"
Lodging Hospitality (May 1979), pp. 6-10.
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Indexed to 1967 (1967=100), these room assignments show a correlation
(58.5) with the number of hotel guests on the national level. Thus,
convention hotels are -- to a certain degree -- trading off unsystematic
risk for systematic risk.
Catering to "group business" is another strategy aimed at stabilizing
demand: Many hotels have what are called "Distinguished Corporate Service"
programs offering lower rates and more amenities to large corporate clients.
Some hotels have special "V. I. P." floors accessible only to major
corporate users.
With respect to recreational demand, luxury resort hotels which cater
to the upper classes are considered to be more stable revenue generators.
However, because of high fixed and semivariable costs, and the popularity
of overseas and Carribean jet travel, there is a real necessity for these
hotels to operate on a four-season basis. This has tended to put New
England resort hotels in an increasingly disadventageous position. The
Mount Washington Hotel, one of the region's premier resort hotels, was
pushed into bankruptcy during the 1973-1975 economic slowdown. Today,
the hotel is only able to sustain itself through conventions and group
tours, which account for fully two-thirds of annual guest volume. 1 6
Casino gambling offers a high volume non-weather-related source of
demand for local hotels and national chains. Legalization of gambling in
Atlantic City has set off a boom in hotel construction in that city.
1 6 Jourdan Houston, "A Dowager Hotel Struggles Back from Bankruptcy,"
New York Times (July 22, 1979), p. F3.
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Recent moves (backed by the industry association) to extend casino gambling
to Barnstable and Berkshire counties have been thwarted in Massachusetts
Legislatures, but continued pro-gambling pressure is expected.
(3) Redefine Market Niche. As travel patterns changed in the 1970's,
major hotel corporations moved towards destination-oriented locations
for their new operations. Transient highway sites are now considered too
risky because of uncertainties surrounding gasoline supplies. As the
president of Holiday Inns, Michael D. Rose, explains:
We intend to continue our pattern of expansion, but we're
being more careful about selecting locations that will be served
by mass transit.17
Holiday Inns, which has traditionally emphasized its roadside operations,
has recently made heavier investments in urban areas. The energy situation
is, and will continue to be, a major consideration for this firm (which
plans a 35,000 room expansion over the next five years).
The tilt toward urban location is evident in figures supplied by the
American Hotel and Motel Association which show that over 90 per cent of
all money spent for new construction and modernization during 1977 occurred
in metropolitan areas. Airport locations are also identified as important
growth markets. 1 8
While urban and airport markets have become important because of
changes in national travel patterns, other market niches have opened up
as the result of intra-industry competition. The best example of this is
the "budget motel" market.
17
Barbara Lovenheim, "Holiday Inns Is Booming," New York Times (August
5, 1979), p. Fl.
18
American Hotel & Motel Asso., Construction & Modernization Forecast
(October 26, 1977). Based on construction reports by chains.
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Major national chains, intent on "creaming" what they considered to
be the more stable portion of the market (primarily businessmen travelling
on a fat expense account), added services and "frills," and upped room-
rates to their maximum levels. This opened up the potential market for
establishments catering to the travelling public and businessmen operating
on fixed budgets. In the words of Fred Roedel, president of the budget-
chain Chalet Susse International:
I did the analysis. It became sort of a case. I found a
couple of important things. First, the (16w-priced motel)
industry is made up of mom and pops. There is a great lack
of professionalism. Very few know what it costs them to
clean a room. Second, the market for inexpensive but
clean and attractive rooms is huge. The big chains have
priced themselves into the stratosphere and the mom and
pops don't have a quality image. There was a gap and it
was a very big one.19
The first budget chain was Motel 6 which opened its first property in
1963. During the early 1970's, these operations demonstrated superior
average return on investment and reduced risk. This latter characteristic
was noted by Arbel and Grier who hypothesized that "when the occupancy rate
for the hotel industry as a whole declines (e.g. during a recession),
people tend to switch from high-priced lodging accomodations to less
expensive facilities. This phenomenon significantly reduced the systematic
risk of the low-rate group of motels." 2 0
19
John Klug, Chalet Susse International (Boston: Harvard Business
School Intercollegrate Case Clearing House, No. 9-673-090, rev. March
1974), p. 1.
20Arbel and Grier, op. cit., p. 19.
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Major chain operations attempted to diversify into the budget field.
Holiday Inns opened Holiday Inn, Jrs., and Howard Johnson tried to start
a budget chain called three Penny Inns. These efforts failed because
(a) the major chains were unable to keep construction costs at a sufficiently
low level (the rule of thumb in the industry states that rates must at
a minimum be $1.25 to $1.50 for each $1,000 in construction costs);
(b) overhead costs were too high for the major corporations; and (c) fran-
chisees complained that parent sponsored budgets would "cut our throats."
For these primarily institutional reasons, the major corporations have
backed away from pursuing the budget market and have left this segment
to new entrants.
An intermediate and more sophisticated strategy for redefining one's
market niche is to go "multi-market." For example, this would mean market-
ing group meetings in the winter to offset the seasonal effects of tourism,
or offering special weekend packages for vacationers to balance out peak
business demand during the week. Going "multi-market" helps to increase
property utilization during slack periods and thereby reduce the downside
risk inherent in any single market segment.
(4) Product Differentiation. Many hotels-motels have sought to
differentiate what is essentially a homogenous product: "a room for the
night." The extent to which the product can be differentiated and identified
with the particular hotel-motel or chain tends to instill "consumer
loyalty." This loyalty is often essential in generating repeat occupancy
(both recreational and business). Repeat customers provide a certain level
of stability in demand, and thus help to reduce the risk of the venture.
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There are numerous strategies devoted to developing product differen-
tiation in the lodging industry. The personalized service provided by the
typical "mom and pop" operation was often a sufficient salespoint to ensure
repeat business. However, as the industry grew and became "big business"
other measures were used. These were not without their costs.
(a) Advertising - created an "image." In 1974, corporations in the
lodging industry spent 1.7% of all receipts on advertisting (compared to
1.2% for all services and 0.8% for all industries).21
Advertising has become increasingly important as the industry orients
itself to pleasure travellers and fights for a larger share of consumer's
discretionary income. "We're competing with Bonwit Teller now for the
consumer's dollar," remarked one chain executive.
(b) Convenience. In large measure, the chains were able to establish
themselves by offering a "free" reservation system and consumer credit.
Individual enterprises belonging to the chain as franchisees must pay for
this computerized reservation service. The nature of this payment varies
according to the chain. For some chains, the fee is on a per reservation
basis, while for others it is part of the royalty fee. Royalities usually
vary between 3% - 5% of total revenue plus an initiation fee of between
$3,000 and $20,000. Several chains have separate initiation, royalty, and
reservation fees.
2 1 Internal Revenue Service, Statistics of Income, 1974, Corporations
Income Tax (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1978).
- 76 -
Credit cards are also not without cost. In 1977, credit card commis-
sions accounted for 1.1% of total sales. 2 2
(c) Location. A key location can give "prestige value" to any
operation. However, a prime location, especially in a metropolitan area,
can be very expensive to acquire or lease. Since the cost of land has to
be factored into the rate schedule, management must be conscious of its
competitive position within the local market. If the hotel enjoys a
monopoly in the locality, the prime location may not be necessary (though
a future competitor may seize the site). If, on the other hand, the local
market is at least nominally competitive, an expensive location and
higher rate structure may work against the operator.
(d) Services. In past years, much emphasis has been placed on offer-
ing the guest a "total package" of service, including, for example,
the use of a rent-a-car. Hotels owned by airlines were part of a larger
"travel package."
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Chapter IV: Institutional Aspects of Investment
Overview
The traditional textbook exposition of the theory of investment posits
the rational entrepreneur seeking to maximize the present value of expected
future profits derived from any given investment. Expected returns are seen
to be based on current profit levels, capacity utilization, and prospects
for long term growth.1 The investment decision is then made subject to the
constraints of perceived risk and capital market conditions (e.g. could the
investment be profitably postponed?).
Empirical studies of firm behavior have often tended to question the
veracity of the neoclassical formulation. 2 Establishments are observed to
be facing imperfect competition, acting under poor information, and facing
the usual oligopolistic quandry (how will my competitors react?). Moreover,
individual firms may pursue objectives other than profit maximization --
such as stabilization of prices and margins, achieving target market shares,
and disuading competition.
lEdwinKuh, "Theory and Investments in the Study of Investment Behavior,"
American Economic Review (Vol. Llll, May, 1963), pp. 260-268.
2 Robert Lanzilloti, "Pricing Objectives in Large Companies," American
Economic Review (Vol. XLVlll, Dec. 1958), pp. 921-940, concludes that:
"No single theory of the firm - and certainly no single motivational hypothesis
such as profit maximazation - is likely to impose an unambiguous course of
action for the firm for any given situation."
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This picture is made all the more complex in the lodging industry because
of the multiplicity of institutional actors involved. The investment decision,
per se, rarely resides with any single actor. This is partially because so
little of new investment - be it expansion, rehabilitation, or new construction
-- is financed out of retained earnings. Investment usually involves recourse
to debt financing. Among corporations, the lodging industry has a much higher
proportion of its total assets accountable for by long-term debt (50.3%) than
do other service sector industries (26.9%), manufacturing industries (17.3%),
or all industries (.13.4%).3 At a minimum, therefore, the investment decision
usually involves an owner and a lender.
The situation becomes more complicated because of the nature of the
industry and the assets involved. Hotels and motels constitute both an
operating business and a real estate investment. As part of the attempt to
boost profitability, the management function was seperated from ownership
(see Chapter Three). Since cash flow (and debt coverage) depends on the
competence of the operator, management becomes an important, and sometimes
determining, factor in the investment decision.
Looking again at the corporate balance sheet, we note that land makes up
10.1 percent of total assets of the lodging industry -- compared to 4.5
percent for the other service sector industries, and 1.6 percent for all
corporations.4 This opens the possibility for real estate appreciation and
speculation for owners of well sited properties. On occassion, this rationale
Internal Revenue Service, Statistics of Income, 1974, Corporation Income
Tax Return (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1978).
41bid.
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may outweigh operating incomes as an ownership and investment consideration.
Of equal, or greater, importance for equity investors is- the fact that
hotels and motels serve as prime vehicles for depreciation, and, as a
consequence, offer significant tax shelter benefits for wealthy investors.
Hotel-motel structures -- which ordinarily account for two-thirds of total
property cost 5 -- have shorter depreciable lives than office buildings or
retail stores. Furniture and equipment -- representing approximately 18%
of cost - have an even faster depreciation schedule than structures.
Depreciation expenses for new structures and equipment can result in
a pre-tax loss even though the cash flow may be positive. This provides
an interest-free method of obtaining working-capital for the enterprise.
More importantly, accelerated depreciation postpones the recognition of
taxable income, can be divided among a number of taxpayers or taxable years,
and can be used to convert ordinary income to capital gains income in later
6
years.
Equity investors may, therefore, be drawn to a hotel-motel project for
a number of reasons. Financing arrangements are often quite intricate, as
different classes of actors may have distinct requirements. For example,
a large downturn commercial hotel project will usually involve -- at the
very least -- a group consisting of equity investors, a hotel operating
company, a developer, and one or more mortgage lenders.
The objectives of these actors may vary widely. The equity investors
5 Clifford T. Fay, Richard C. Rhoades, Robert L. Rosenblatt, Managerial
Accounting For The Hospitality Industries, 2nd edition (Dubuque: Wm. C.
Brown Co., 1976) p. 517.
6 Ibid.
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may be split into two groups. One group (perhaps consisting of foreign
investors) may be primarily concerned with. long-term real estate apprecia-
tion at the site and a steady cash-flow. Another group (perhaps a syndicate
consisting of wealthy doctors and lawyers) may be motivated by the tax
shelter benefits to be derived from rapid depreciation of new structures
and equipment. The operating company may be interested in the potential
for rate escalation and volume growth (since they often work on the basis
of a fee equal to a fixed percentage of income). The mortgage holder may
judge the worthiness of the investment on the basis of the debt coverage
ratio, the amount of loanable funds available, and the yield spread on
alternative investments. The developer will probably be concerned with a
quick turnover of his invested capital through a speedy construction process,
ready access to construction finance, and an assured final take-out by a
permanent mortgage or, preferably for a face amount in excess of total costs.
Under conditions such as these, it is not difficult to imagine situations
whereby groups of actors, all pursuing rational "profit maximization" ends,
produce outcomes which grossly distort and render meaningless any notion of
supply/demand equilibrium. A management company may attempt to overstate
market demand, a developer may inflate the value of the finished product,
and the equity partners may seek also to push up depreciable costs while
minimizing their share of risk capital. A mortgagor flush with investment
funds, and looking desperately for outlets, may uncritically accept these
assessments.
The result of this situation might be overcapacity, with fixed costs
possibly in excess of income. For example, in Atlanta some $250 million
worth of real estate, including a 500-room hotel, fell back into the hands
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of lenders in early 1978. The Omni complex, representing $100 million
of investment, could not service the interest on its debt even when
fully leased.7 Lenders convinced that "Atlanta is booming"' poured
hundreds of millions of available dollars into real estate deals without
careful analysis.
Many hotel-motel projects do not depend on the participation of
large institutional lenders or real estate syndicates. Smaller motels
may be financed entirely through personal savings, borrowings from
friends, a purchase money mortgage from the previous owner, or possibly
a second mortgage on the family house. The investment decision may
be based solely on a desire for income security during old age. Many
motels and smaller hotels are strictly "ma and pa" type of operations
whose aim is to generate sufficient cash flow to support -- at least
in part -- a family, couple, or individual.
7
"Atlanta's Worst Flop in Real Estate Yet," Business Week (No. 2523,
February 27, 1978) , p. 33.
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institutional Forms of Ownership and Control: The Chains
The three forms of legal organization in the lodging industry are
proprietorships, partnerships, and corporations. Underlying these legal
forms is a basic division between chain and independent control.
According to the American Hotel and Motel Association (AHMA), in
1977 chains accounted for 29.2 percent of all U. S. properties and 63.1
8
percent of all available rooms. The AHMA reports that the twenty five
largest chains (7.6 percent of all chains) control 78 percent of the
rooms in the total chain market, and just under 50 percent of all hotel-
motel rooms available in the U. S. The top seven chains* alone control
71 percent of all chain rooms and 45 percent of the U. S. total.
Although no precise breakdown of chain/non-chain affiliation according
to legal form of organization is available, it appears reasonable to assume
that chains are most heavily represented among corporations (which include
all the "parent" chains) and partnerships (a popular form of syndicating
ownership for franchisees). Proprietorships are predominatly small
independents, though they have been seeking chain affiliation in increas-
ing numbers over the past decade.
The amount of control that a national chain exercises over an indiv-
idual establishment varies widely. One sample indicates that approximately
15 percent of all chain properties are company owned, eight percent are
company managed, six percent are leased, and 71 percent are
8American Hotel and Motel Association, 1977 Chain Lodging Analysis.
*Holiday Inns (258,711), Best Western (92,770), Ramada Inns (87,883),
Sheraton (74,707), Budget Motels (69,394), Hilton (64,414), and Howard
Johnson (58,977).
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9
franchised.
The relationship between franchisee or member in a referral organi-
zation and the national chain is determined contractually. The payment
to the chain is generally based on an initial fee, royalties, an adver-
tising fee, a reservation fee, and often times "other" payments. The
chart below compares the requirements necessary to join the nation's
four leading chain and referral groups.10
Chain Initial
Fee
Holiday $20,000 +
Inns $150/rm.
over 100
rms.
Best $2,040 +
Western $18 each
room over
20
Royalty Advertising
Fee
4% gross 1.8% gross
room room
revenue revenue
None 7C/rm/day
Reservation
Fee
None
7.20/
rm/day
Other
Fees
Holidex (com-
puter termi-
nal) fee:
$ 3/rm/month
monthly;
annual dues
3% gross
room
sales
$4.41/rm/
month
$15,000 4% gross None
room
revenue
$450 term-
inal rent-
al +19%
gross rm.
sales
1.6% gross
room
rentals
1?/rm/day
training fee
None
9
This is based on a sample consisting of 33 large firms controlling
4,549 properties representing 827.926 rooms. Jean-Robert H. Cauvin,
"Executive-Compensation Practices in the North American Lodging Industry,"
Cornell H. R. A. Quarterly (May 1979), pp. 53-60. The American Hotel and
Motel Association reports (1977) 10,912 chain properties in the U. S. and
1,276,922 chain rooms. The Industry and Trade Administration of the Dept.
of Commerce reported 5,808 chain properties in 1977, of which 22.6 percent
were chain owned, but this does not appear to include "membership groups
such as Best Western.
1 0
"Chain and Franchise Directory," Lodging Hospitality (Aug. 1978), pp.
63-65.
$l00/rm;
$15,000
minimum
Ramada
Inns
Sheraton
Corp.
(ITT)
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Great emphasis has been placed in recent years on management contracts
as the most desirable method for chain expansion. The terms of the
management contract usually specify both a basic fee (based on a percentage
of gross revenue) and an "incentive fee" (generally a percentage of gross
operating income based on a sliding scale). Management contracts allow the
chain to exercise direct control over daily operations (as opposed to
the franchisee's relative autonomy). In addition, management contracts
allow chain managers to determine discretionary purchasing of supplies and
services (some of which the chains themselves sell).1 1
Perhaps most importantly, from the perspective of the chain, manage-
ment contracts offer a relatively risk-free avenue to expansion. These
arrangements usually require neither an equity commitment or assumption
of debt on the part of the chain. These matters remain the province
of the hotel-motel investors. However, because of the keen competition
among chains for these lucrative contracts, many are now willing to pro-
vide some money in the form of land financing or working capital. The
expansion of management contracts has also necessitated a concomitant
growth in mid-level management staff capable of taking on operating
responsibilites.
Chain ownership of new operations is usually reserved for the most
profitable establishments, particularly casinos. Leases have fallen into
1 1The Industry and Trade Administration reports total sales of
products and services from franchisors to franchisees in 1977 of $24.6
billion (on 5,808 reporting establishments).
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disfavor as a form of chain control, because they require a long-term
commitment to pay a fixed monthly rental. Management contracts enable
the chain to take a assured percentage of gross revenues (and thereby
cover all overhead costs), and share in the profitability of the enter-
prise. This provides income insurance during cyclical downturns and
boosts corporate profits during upswings.
Many chains have minimum requirements for the size of an affiliated
property -- either as a franchise, leased, or managed operation. Hilton,
Sheraton, and Howard Johnson (which is not in management) all require a
minimum of 100 rooms for new franchises.12 The major chains will not take
on any property for management if it cannot guarantee a minimum of
$100,000/year in fees. Many will not look at a management contract on
a property of less than 300 rooms. This has opened up the market for
independent management companies. As Lodging Hospitality reports:
Well-established management firms.. .can often undercut the
chains' management contract fees because of low overhead. An
independent firm allows the owner to continue his present
franchise affiliation while most chains require new management-
contracted properties to join their system.13
The minimum size at which absentee management can profitability be
instituted, from the perspective of the hotel owner, depends on whether
12
"Chain and Franchise Directory," Lodging Hospitality (Aug. 1978),
pp. 63-65.
13
Robert Kiener, "The Management Contract," Lodging Hospitality
(April 1975), p. 45.
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profits can be sufficiently increased to absorb a charge equal to three
to five percent of gross revenue. According to hotel finance expert
Stephen Brener, this number has increased from 50 units twenty years ago
to 150 units today.14 One owner-operator of a 155 room hotel in our
interview sample indicated that he could still not afford absentee manage-
ment because, he felt, total administrative salaries would then expand
beyond the carrying capacity of the business.
Influence of Lenders: Insurance Companies
Mortgage lenders play an important role in emphasizing professional
management capability and reinforcing chain affiliation. Insurance
companies, the most important institution in the capital market for hotels
and motels*, overwhelmingly prefer franchise agreements. In a sample
consisting of 34 of the nation's 51 largest insurance companies, Lodging
Hospitality found that all but two companies required chain affiliation.
1 4 Stephen W. Brener, "Considering Absentee Management?," Lodging
Hospitality (May 1976), pp. 16-17.
*Donald R. Knab, senior vice-president for real estate at Prudential
Insurance Company, the nation's largest institutional investor in real
estate, states that Prudential is "the country's largest owner of motels."
The New Money Target: Profitable Real Estate," Business Week (August 1,
1977), p. 57. Equitable Life Assurance Society is said to have over one
billion in hotels and motels, or about 10% of its total real estate port-
folio (Business Week, July 17, 1978, p. 71). Metropolitan Life Insurance
Company and Aetna Life and Casualty each have hotel-motel investments in
the hundreds of millions, while John Hancock's investment is estimated
at $325 million, with $100 million in additional commitments (Lodging
Hospitality, December, 1978). Most of the more regional insurance compan-
ies, such as Connecticut General and Massachusetts Mutual also have
sizeable hotel-motel investments.
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15
Management contracts were required by nine of the lenders.
Because of the emphasis on management (fueled in part by a fear of
direct management in the eventuality of foreclosure) institutional lenders
usually refuse to finance those projects too small to support profes-
sional absentee management.* Insurance companies avoid projects of less
than 100-200 rooms -- the average minimum is 121 -- and most prefer
larger hotels. One interviewee (an insurance company real estate
executive) considered the most desirable type of investment to be "a
middle sized hotel, say 250-350 rooms, not very expensive, $25,000 to
$30,000 per room, with extensive facilities..."
Insurance companies prefer larger projects for other reasons as
well. Perhaps most importantly, large hotels-motels are more easily able
to support income participation clauses, or "kickers," as a condition of
the mortgage contract. As is the case with management contracts, income
participation clauses require a percentage of revenue (one percent of
gross room sales is typical) in addition to the contract interest rate.
Institutional lenders like kickers because they provide a hedge against
inflation, and add approximately a quarter point to yield.
15
Stephen W. Brener, "Where and How Financing Will Come in 1979,"
Lodging Hospitality (December 1978), pp. 22-25.
*Bruce W. Fraser, Director of real estate investment for Massachusetts
Mutual, has stated that: "We like to balance our portfolio with commercial
investments and hotel investments. Hotels are riskier, but we can charge
higher interest rates. We look for hotels or motels with major chain
affiliation, a franchise or management contract. It would take a most
unusual circumstance for a small, independent operator to get money. It
has been done, but on a very selective basis." Lodging and Food-Service
News, December 11, 1976.
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Income participation clauses. are required on about 50 percent of new
deals according to one industry source. They vary in complexity, and may
involve moving percentages of "participation" dictated by threshhold levels
of income after operating expense and debt service have been paid. The
ultimate kicker would be for the lender to require an equity position
("free equity") and share in proceeds of refinancing, real estate appre-
ciation, profits, and the benefits of depreciation.
Owners generally try to resist the imposition of income participation
clauses, or attempt to restrict their requirements. However, since insur-
ance companies control perhaps as much as 70% of the mortgage market for
large (over 100 rooms) properties,16 they are often "the only game in
town." Commercial banks limit their involvement to interim construction
loans (and require commitments for permanent take-out). Savings banks
are approachable on the local level, but usually have smaller allocations
for commerical mortgages generally and hotels-motels specifically. Savings
banks are much more sensitive to fluctuations in consumer savings (dis-
intermediation especially) and therefore tend to shy away from these
"higher risk" mortgages.
Pension funds offer an attractive alternative source of capital for
hotel-motel development because of their recent tendency towards diverisi-
fication (prescribed by the Employees Retirement Income Security Act).
Some pension funds have made direct investments in hotels and motels in
New England. However, many of the funds most active in real estate are
16
see "Chains see Modest Growth in Capacity During 1979," Lodging
Hospitality (December 1978), p. 30.
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investing through "commingled funds" managed by large banks, and, again,
insurance companies. Prudential's PRISA and Equitable Account 8 are two
of the largest of these funds.
Corporate Strategies: Out of Ownership
Hotel-motel corporations have recourse to borrowing not only through
the mortgage market, but also through the market for publicly-offered
bonds and debentures.* There is also the quasi-borrowing option of a
sale-leaseback transaction.** Real-estate investment trusts (REIT's)
provided a significant amount of both short and long-term money in the
early 1970's before the real estate market collapsed in 1974-1975. For
example, Hotel Irvestors (a REIT) did the construction financing on the
Boston (airport) Hilton in 1971 and held the long-term mortgage (with a
kicker).
Major chains are capable of capitalizing on franchise and management
fees to take larger equity positions on their own properties, but they
*
This bond market is, once more, dominated by insurance company pur-
chases. Life insurance companies are the largest institutional holder
of corporate bonds.
**This range of borrowing options "is available mainly to larger
hotel-motel chains...For smaller chains and independent establishments,
bond and debenture financing, or sales-lease back transactions, if any,
are much less prevalent." Royal Ship and Robert Morre Fisher, "The
Postwar Boom In Hotels and Motels," Staff Economic Studies No. 9 [1965]
Board of Governors of The Federal Reserve System.
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have, for the most part*, shied away from this strategy. The reason for
this is that as publicly held corporations**, they are much more concerned
about the value of their stock than their relative ownership position.
By de-emphasizing ownership (or large equity and debt layouts) the corp-
oration is able to claim its profits on a smaller asset base. By eliminat-
ing investment in structures the company reduces its book depreciation
costs. Reduction in long-term debt means less interest payments. The net
result is both higher (reported) earnings per share, and greater returns
on assets. This makes the company's stock appear to be more attractive
and is an influence in upgrading its price/earnings (P/E) ratio. A
brief review of recent events concerning Sheraton and Hilton provides
a good example of this strategy in operation.
Sheraton was a Boston-based company started in 1937. By 1968, the
company owned, leased, or had under management agreements 92 hotels, and
operated through its franchisees 104 motor inns. In February, 1968,
Sheraton was acquired by ITT*** in exchange for 3.6 million shares of
*Howard Johnson is an exception.
**Of the twelve largest hotel chains (those with sales of over $100
million) five are publicly held independents and seven are publicly
held subsidiaries.
***According to Anthony Sampson (The Sovereign State of ITT (New York:
Stein and Day, 1973), p. 96): "hotels were a growth industry that could
link up with other ITT industries, and 'international development,' they
[ITT] predicted, 'should produce extraordinary results.' Hotels were less
vulnerable than telephone companies to nationalization, and ITT could push
up room changes further, and makes further economies. Most important of
all, Sheraton employed very conservative accounting, using its profits
to build up assets, rather than to show high earnings. ITT, by changing
the accounting, could show a spectacular improvement."
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of common and 300 thousand shares of preferred stock with a combined
market value of $200 million.
The conglomerate established a five-year plan with the objective of
challenging Hilton and Intercontinental Hotels* on the world market.
The strategy called for the expenditure of $700 million for new construc-
tion in 38 countries, including the U. S.
This strategy was brought into question in 1970 when the lustre
began to fade from ITT's stock price and high P/E ratio. This was largely
the result of (1) anti-trust suits; (2) cut-backs in military contracts,
and; (3) the economic slow-down in 1970. As John Blair notes:
Ironically, the very practices that facilitated the growth
of conglomerates on the upswing became an albatross around their
necks during the downswing. As total sales and earnings fall,
the payments of fixed obligations incurred through leverage-
interest on debt and dividends on preferred stock-absorb progres-
sively larger shares of gross income, leading to even further
declines in net earnings. The intensification of competitive
rivalry inherent in buyers' markets requires cost-reducing
improvements in facilities; if they are financed through new
stock issues, the result is a "dilution" of the value of
existing shares; if they are financed through credit, the result
is a further increase in payments on fixed obligations.17
Sheraton's ambitious expansion plans were obviously exacerbating this
predicament. ITT had already sold off 15 hotels in the South and Midwest
*Hilton overseas operations were taken over by TWA; Intercontinental
was absorbed by Pan American.
1 7John Blair, Economic Concentration (New York: Hartcourt Brace,
1972), p. 299.
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to support its international operation. Sheraton now moved to dispose of
51 additional hotels in the U. S., including properties in Boston, Spring-
field, Quincy (MA), and Providence. In the words of Sheraton senior vice-
president John Brogan: "At the time we were divesting in the U. S., Shera-
ton was active in expanding overseas, particularly Europe and the Middle
East, but also Latin America and the Far East." Sheraton is now "a
leader-if not the leader-in international hotels." 1 8
By 1973, Sheraton-ITT had re-evaluated its expansion strategy and
decided to get out of ownership altogether. "We're not interested in own-
ing hotels," stated Sheraton president Howard P. "Bud" James. "Let some-
one else own them. We'll run them...If we have to own a hotel to get one,
we don't want it."1 9 According to vice-president Brogan, this now:
fits into ITT's return on assets program. As an earnings-
per-share company, they're very much interested in our bottom
line, and we really do far better from the standpoint of profits
on assets -- based on a very low asset base and very high profits
from management contracts.20
Today, Sheraton's growth stems from a policy, expressed by its
18
Paul Robbins, "Look What Sheraton's Done Lately," The New Englander
(October 1978), p. 51.
19
Ibid.
20
Ibid.
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president, of "growth with other people's money."21 Capital assets, which
peaked at $700 in 1973, are now less than $400 and still going down.
According to ITT's 1977 Annual Report: "It is estimated that by 1982
Sheraton's name will be on a network of five billion dollars in properties
with an investment of approximately $250 million."
This additional capital will not be borrowed. Since 1974, ITT has
been on a "zero incremented debt program." This way management fees and
franchise royalties, which come off the top of operating revenues with
little risk to Sheraton-ITT, will go right to the bottom line of the
corporate balance sheet. In addition, steady revenue growth (expected
to increase from $1.5 billion in 1978 to $2.4 billion in 1982), makes
the subsidiary a significant cash generator for ITT's extensive worldwide
operation.
Hilton shifted emphasis from ownership to management in 1975. The
company sold a half-interest in six of its best hotels to Prudential
Insurance for $83 million. Hilton applied $24 million of the cash
proceeds to wiping out corporate debt; and free of mortgages on the six
hotels, Hilton was able to reduce its long-term debt from $176 million
to $118 million. In all, Hilton was able to lessen its yearly interest
and depreciation charges by $3.2 million after taxes. By maintaining
management contracts on the sold properties and aggressively pursuing
franchising, the company was able to increase the number of hotels under
21
"Tinkering With Geneen's Growth Machine At ITT," Business Week
(May 15, 1978), p. 60.
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its control from 146 to 161 (this in a recession year) even though total
22
corporate assets declined by over $45 million.
Hilton used another $25 million of the Prudential proceeds to buy
back four million shares of its own stock at very low prices. As a result,
of these transactions, Hilton's net income per share increased from
$2.09 to $2.87 and the value of the company's stock increased from four
to 17. The Hilton family's holdings rose from 26% to 31% of outstanding
shares, while its market value jumped from $16 million to $68 million.
"If you are a certain kind of investor, ownership and cash flow are fine,"
remarked Barron Hilton. "But for us, immediate earnings per share are
what we are seeking."2 3
The closing and subsequent sale of the Boston Statler-Hilton in 1976
should be understood in this context. According to one industry source,
Hilton was unwilling to seek refinancing for the $20 million necessary to
upgrade the property,.as the company was then pursuing its debt reduction
strategy. High prevailing interest rates dampened outside investor
interest, and the hotel was closed down in late 1975. Five hundred workers
were discharged. In early 1976, Equitable Life Insurance, the mortgage
holder, brokered the sale to a local hotel management company and offered
22 See Hilton Hotels Annual Report, 1978 (for the year ending December
31, 1977).
2 3
"Hilton Turns the Tables," Forbes (July 1, 1976), p. 40.
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generous financing terms. The hotel was reopened as the Boston Park Plaza.
It is still undergoing a slow remodeling.
Equity Investors
When corporate chains began moving out of ownership into management
and marketing, an "equity gap" was created in the industry. Insurance
companies shifted some of their immense capital resources into ownership,
while maintaining their mortgage holdings as well. Many insurance companies
went into "joint ventures" with other equity holders. Prudential, for
example, is in a joint venture with Burlington Northern in owning many La
Quinta motels.
Foreign investors have become important in some local markets -- New
York in particular. Some foreign corporations have purchased American
chains: Aer Lingus (which is owned by the Irish Government) purchased
Dunfey Hotels in 1976 from Aetna Life and Casualty; both Nestle's and
the British hotel company Truste House Forte have extensive U. S. holdings.
In New England, foreign capital (primarily from Canada) has made its
presence felt in Providence, Boston, and Portland. The aggregate effect
of this direct investment is not considered strong in the region.
Many corporations maintain some minority ownership in their chain's
larger hotels. In some cases, this is done to exhibit a greater commit-
ment to the mortgage lender. At other times, this is for more "practical"
reasons. The Securities and Exchange Commission recently accused the
Hyatt Corporation at having failed to disclose conflicts of interest between
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it and the Pritzker family, which controls 35 percent of the company's
stock. One of the allegations- charged that Hyatt had failed to disclose
that:
Three hotel ventures in New Orleans, Indianapolis and
Cambridge, MA, financed almost entirely by the Prudential
Insurance Company of America, were structured "from the
outset to provide, among other benefits, substantial tax
benefits to the Pritzker family, even though the Pritzker
family supplied a small amount of the capital involved.24
Tax benefits, available through rapid depreciation, are a major
inducement for equity investors. Insurance companies are relatively less
interested in this potential benefit because they are taxed at less than
the corporate or personal (high income) rate. Consequently, developers
often times organize syndicated partnerships to attract equity money
(often in excess of the developer's own initial investment), and distribute
tax shelters.
For owners of smaller hotels and motels, depreciation is very help-
ful, but not in itself a sole criteria for investment. The sources of
equity for smaller owner-operators are usually savings or personal property
(i.e., their house or other business). Debt capital is generally avail-
able from local saving banks, but many small operators must make use of
purchase-money mortgages or personal borrowings.
Capital Investment Behavior 1958-1977: Supply and Demand
As a bench-mark for discussion, we have constructed time series data
for 1958-1977 showing the key indicators of supply and demand: occupancy,
2 4Judith Miller, "S. E. C. Cites Hyatt on Disclosure," New York Times,
December 8, 1978, p. C.3.
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room rates, income available per room, and investment. Occupancy, rates,
and income data have been obtained from Harris, Kerr, Forster and Company's
Trends in the Hotel-Motel Business, 1978 Edition. Rates and income have
been deflated to 1972 dollars.
Total capital investment for hotels and motels is difficult to esti-
mate accurately. As a measure of the relative movement of investment
acitivity, we have used the figures for gross investment in new construc-
tion and renovations contracts (excluding furnishings, fixtures, equip-
ment, landl as reported by the F. W. Dodge Corporation. Unfortunately,
this data is available only for the period 1958-1971. To complete the
time series, we have employed the construction reports (Current Construc-
tion) issued by the U. S. Bureau of Census, using the category "non-
housekeeping residentials" as our source. Since non-housekeeping residen-
tials includes hotels, motels, dormitories, and nursing homes, an esti-
mated proportion applicable soley to hotel-motels was determined on the
basis of total hotel-motel investment reported by F. W. Dodge in 1971
and the total non-housekeeping residential reported by the Bureau of the
Census in the same year. This percentage was then applied to the Census
data for the years 1972-1977.
To partially assess the validity of this approach, a time series on
total capital investment for five of the leading firms in the hotel
industry (Holiday Inns, Ramada Inns, Howard Johnson, Sonesta, and Hilton)
was assembled using data reported in Valueline. This series was then
matched with the Dodge-Census series (see Figure 1 ), and found to be
comparable. The full time series for occupancy, average room rates, income
Figure 1
New Construction in the Hotel-Motel Industry
1962 - 1976
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and new construction is presented in Table 1 and Figure 2.
U. S. Chronology
1. 1950's (Background)
During the 1950's hotel-motel industry capacity expanded in excess of
demand. According to a Federal Reserve commissioned study,25 the supply
of available hotel-motel rooms increased by a third, while aggregate
demand rose only slightly. Motels accounted for most of this increase,
proliferating at an average rate of eight percent a year. Construction
of hotels was limited primarily to modernization of and additions to
structures erected before the early 1930's.
According to the Federal Reserve study, the expansion of new facili-
ties was largely attributable to the Internal Revenue Code of 1954 which
gave first owners of new depreciable property the option of using a de-
clining balance method involving a rate of up to twice that of straight
line. This enabled owners to convert ordinary income into capital gains
at a later date.
The boom in hotel [and motel] construction which emerged in
the 1950's was more in response to anticipations of capital gain
than of current yield -- prospects favored in part by changes
since 1954 in Federal tax laws and regulations... .26
Since "used" properties could be depreciated at 150 percent, this
2 5 Royal Ship and Robert Moore, op. cit.
2 6 Ibid., p. 21.
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Table 1
Occupancy, Room Rates, Income, and New Construction, 1958-1977
Percentage
of Occupancy
66.9%
68.4%
67.4%
66.4%
66.7%
67.0%
68.4%
69.7%
70.7%
72.3%
72.1%
72.0%
67.8%
65.7%
67.4%
68.4%
67.4%
64.4%
67.5%
69.5%
Average
Room Rate
$20.32
20.36
20.23
20.07
19.86
19.66
19.82
19.88
19.97
20.39
20.94
21.47
21.71
21.17
20.74
20.79
20.56
20.84
21.04
21.44
Deflated to $ 19721
Income Per
Available Room2
$2 ,257
2,364
2,149
2,143
2,050
2,008
2 ,071
2,205
2,344
2,490
2,553
2,547
2,221
1,941
1,967
1,940
1,845
1,688
1,998
2,023
New
Construction (millions)
$ 505.5
775.3
883.5
838.1
1,051.2
925.7
975.2
906.7
774.2
791.9
913-0
1,198.5
1,044.5
1,221.6
1,583.5
1,795.9
1,116.6
723.7
589.4
600.8
lFor room rates and income, figures adjusted using personal consumption expen-
diture deflator for services. For new construction, figures adjusted by non-
residential structures deflator. Economic Report of the President (Washington:
GPO, 1978) , table B-3.
2Signifies income per available room after property taxes and insurance, but
before depreciation, amortization, interest, other taxes, and profit.
Sources: Trends in the Hotel-Motel Business, 1978 Edition (New York: Harris,
Kerr, Forster and Company, 1978). For New Construction see Table
Year
1958
1959
1960
1961
1962
1963
1964
1965
1966
1967
1968
1969
1970
1971
1972
1973
1974
1975
1976
1977
Figure 2
Key Indicators in the Hotel-Motel Industry
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resulted in "a somewhat higher rate of turnover of ownership of existing
properties than would have taken place during the same period in the
absence of such tax changes." 2 7 These changes in the tax code meant that
many hotel companies became just as interested in real estate speculation
and "leveraging" as hotel operating.* Potential tax benefits were often
capitalized into the depreciable assets, resulting in higher prices. This
further accelerated the real estate boom in hotels and motels.
2. 1958-1963
Capital investment in new facilities continued to rise slightly despite
a fall of: 1.4% in room occupancy, 3.49% in room rates, and 15.06% in
income per available room. The investment was sustained primarily by
motels newly placed along Interstate highways. The number of Interstate
System interchanges open or under way at the beginning of 1964 totaled
4,486, with 8,480 planned to be constructed.
Many older motels were by-passed by the new highway system. While
it is not possible to accurately fix the mortality rate for these motels,
27
Ibid., p. 29.
*For example, A. B. Cantor, president of Carter Hotels Operating
Company was quoted as describing himself thus: "I buy and sell hotels.
I'm a dealer in 'em. This place I hang onto, like out of loyalty, after
nineteen years, but the rest, they come and go." Quoted in "Hotel
men look at their business," Catering Employee (October, 1959), p. 25.
Donald E. Lundberg (The Hotel and Restaurant Business, 2nd Edition,
Boston: Cahners Books International, 1976) described Sheraton's strategy
in the late 1950's as: "There is a time to buy a hotel and a time to
sell it, the timing dependent upon the tax base which is left for depre-
ciation in a property, general business conditions, and whether or not
the cash might not be put to better use in another property."
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we note that the number of hotel-motel proprietorships (primarily small motel
operationsl in the U. S. declined by a startling 11 percent in the 1961-
1963 period alone (see Table 2 ). This represents an absolute decline of
11,092 businesses.*
During the same three year period, the number of corporations grew by
24 percent (an absolute increase of 2,806), reflecting some incorporation
of existing proprietorships and partnerships, but also new speculative
motel developments along the Interstates.
The Interstate highway program was an important factor in destabilizing
the industry. As John P. Henderson concluded in his 1965 study:
Inadvertently, the highway program, which has been the big-
gest growth factor for the motel division, has also introduced
a drastic change in the economic structure. Not only has the
family-size establishment suffered most from relocations, but
it is being inevitably ruled out of the new freeway market.
In many instances, the superhighway motel is being built to
state or federal specifications that traditional family pro-
prietorships could not possibly meet. The result has been
the growth of chain operations, which provide the 100-unit
establishment with restaurant required by the major controlled-
access highway. Thus, the pioneers, the small proprietors
who started it all with a few crude "tourist cabins" or a more
ambitous "motor court" with hamburger stand, have enjoyed only
limited growth in the industry. The big chains such as Howard
Johnson's and Holiday Inns, largely financed out of funds
supplied by the insurance companies, operate the luxury
establishments.28
*
Some of these may have incorporated or become partnerships, though
the net growth in those types of organizations was only 2,079.
2 8 John P. Henderson, Labor Market Institutions and Wages in the
Lodging Industry (East Lansing: Michigan State University Business
Studies, 1965), p. 20.
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Table 2
Number of Corporations, Proprietorships, and Partnerships
for Hotels, Motels, and Tourist Courts for the
Years 1961-19751
Corporations
11,704
13,007
14,510
15,956
17,118
17,180
18,067
16,851
17,525
20,049
19,897
19,349
20,361
18,236
15,551
Proprietorships
63,225
56,280
52,133
50,464
48,709
49,965
50,260
51,972
45,740
43,217
43,185
48,152
44,276
47,792
45,599
Partnerships
10,218
10,349
9,491
9,893
9,995
8,713
7,758
8,261
7,755
8,233
8,218
7,367
8,629
9,083
8,606
Total
85,147
79,636
76,134
75,403
75,822
75,858
76,085
77,084
71,020
71,499
71,300
74,868
73,266
75,111
69,756
lThe industry classification for
camps, and other lodging places.
corporations is hotels, rooming
Source: Internal Revenue Service, Statistics of Income Business Tax
Returns (Washington: GPO), 1961-1975.
Year
1961
1962
1963
1964
1965
1966
1967
1968
1969
1970
1971
1972
1973
1974
1975
houses,
- 105 -
While large highway motels were enjoying a boom, hotel receipts stag-
nated as suburbanization took command. Many central cities, in New England
and elsewhere, experienced population shrinkage,* loss of retail and whole-
sale trade, and a decline in manufacturing employment.**
Most older hotels were built during the time when railroad terminals
were the center of urban commerce -- adjacent to principal department
stores, near important office complexes, and not far from factories situated
near freight yards. The birth of the Interstate Highway System (1956) and
the growth of airport terminals, did much to encourage the relocation of
manufacturing plants, office, and retail stores to sites outside of the
central business district. While this shift in transportation patterns
did foster the growth of thousands of suburban motels and motor hotels,
it spelled doom for many inter-city hotels. The number of hotels with
25 or more guest rooms declined by 17.5% between 1957 and 1962 alone.
Moreover, despite the sharp reduction in the total stock, the average
occupancy rate for transient hotels fell from 74% to 67% between 1958
29
and 1963.
*
The eleven New England cities with populations over 100,000 lost:
7.6% of their inhabitant during 1950-1969; 5.2% between 1960 and 1970;
and 5.0% during 1970-1976.
**
Between 1958 and 1963, central cities lost 7.9% of their manufac-
turing employment and 1.8% of all retail and wholesale jobs. Suburbs
registered gains of 12.2% and 22.6% respectively in manufacturing and
trade employment. See Alexander Ganz, Our Large Cities: New Light on
Their Recent Transformation (Cambridge: MIT Lab for Environmental Studies,
1972), figures are for 11 largest SMSA's.
29
Trends in the Hotel-Motel Business, 1978 Edition (New York: Harris,
Kerr, Forster and Co., 1978).
- 106 -
3. 1963-1969
New construction activity (measured in 1972 dollars) fell each year
from 1964 to 1966. The number of new rooms entering the market declined
30
from an annual rate of 105 thousand in 1963 to 78,0Y00 in 1967.
This cutback in aggregate production reflected the poor market con-
ditions prevalent in 1963. Sheraton, for example, announced in its 1963
Annual Report that "until such time as the real estate cycle once more
turns upward, Sheraton will concentrate on securing management contracts
and franchising" rather than new construction of company owned hotels and
motels. Sheraton had even taken the almost unheard of step of drastically
reducing room rates in 1962.
Although production remained at a relatively low level until 1968,
demand -- both business and recreationally oriented -- increased precipi-
tously. As a result, between 1963 and 1967 occupancy increased by 5.2
percent, room rates climbed by 3.7 percent, and income per available room
jumped by fully 24 percent. Beginning in 1968, new construction picked
up to expand the base for this high level of profitability, and capture
a larger share of this market growth.
The increase in product demand can be attributed to the general economic
prosperity fueled by the Vietnam War. Importantly, industrial automation
30
A Critical Analysis of the Domestic Hotel-Motel Industry (New York:
Moore and Schley, Cameron and Co., 1971), p. 23. Cited in Arthur Mantel,
An Economic Analysis of the Market Structure of the Hotel-Motel Industry,
unpublished Ph. D dissertation (Amherst, MA: University of Massachusetts,
April, 1974).
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coupled with enhanced union negotiation power had yielded an expansion
in worker vacation time, and a concomitant increase in recreational travel
and transient lodging demand.
Before World War II paid vacations were available primarily to
managers, officials, and professional workers. During the 1950's,
vacation time increased, but many workers traded off for higher pay so
as to more easily carry the burden of child-rearing costs and satisfy
a pent up demand for consumer goods (induced by heavy advertising and
the extension of suburban life styles).
In the 1960's, the number of vacation weeks grew at a spectacular
rate. From 1960 to 1969, the total number of weeks that workers spent
on vacations increased by almost 50 percent -- from 87 to 129 million
weeks. During the same period, the average number of vacation weeks per
production worker increased from 1.3 to 1.8.31
With lodging costs taking 10% to 11% of total pleasure travel expen-
ditures, the hotel-motel industry experienced an increase in total receipts
of 23.4% during 1963-1967. The increase was, again, predominatly in
the motel/motor hotel division of the industry, but hotels were able to
recoup their 1958-1963 losses in occupancy and income per available room.
Lodging industry growth did not go unnoticed by conglomerates and
other corporate giants. Continuing in the tradition first established
31
Geoffrey H. Moore and Janice Neipert Hedges, "Trends in Labor and
Leisure," Montly Labor Review, U. S. Department of Labor (Washington:
GPO, February 1971), appears in Montly Labor Review Reader, BLS, Bulletin
1868, 1975.
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by transportation companies (the railroads of the 19th century), airlines
acquired hotel corporations so as to further horizontal integration. Pan
American had started the pattern in 1947 by setting up a subsidiary Inter-
national (later Intercontinential) Rotels, Inc. In 1967, Trans World
Airways purchased Hilton International and other airlines quickly followed
suit.* The ITT (which then owned Hertz) acquisition of Sheraton has
already been mentioned.
Gulf Oil and Holiday Inns achieved economies of scale by engaging in
joint advertising and setting up a common credit card. Many Gulf service
stations opened adjacent to Holiday Inns. 32
Holiday Inns, the largest of the chains, achieved both vertical and
horizontal integration in the 1960's and furthered its control over both
franchisees and consumers. These efforts include: (1) Innkeepers Supply
Company (furniture, draperies, cleaning compounds, etc); (2) Merchants
*
Airlines with hotels in the U. S. include: Aer Lingus (Dunfey
Hotels), Air France (Meridien Hotels), American (Americana Hotels);
Braniff (Braniff International Hotels); Eastern (Rockresorts), Hughes
Airwest (Summa Corporation), and United (Western International). Lund-
berg, op. cit., p. 27.
32
Lundberg, op. cit., p. 291. Gulf Oil also moved to guarantee a
portion of Holiday Inns debt, thus permitting the hotel chain to secure
lower interest rates (Ibid.). Holiday Inns executives were also personally
close to John Hancock Insurance Company executives. The insurance company
supplied much of the loan capital (Ibid.).
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Hotel Supply Company (kitchen equipment); (3) Coffee Host (coffee-making
equipment); (4) Holiday Press (directories, printing services, office
equipment and supplies); (5) General Data Corporation (accounting services);
(6) Holiday Inn University (training); and, numerous other enterprises
including real estate, construction, and nursing homes. In 1969, Holiday
Inns acquired by merger TCO Industries, Inc., which owned Continental
Trailways (the second largest intercity bus company) and Delta Steamship
Lines, Inc.3 3
4. 1969-1977
This period was characterized by over expansion, industrial instability,
and reorganization along the lines of greater chain control. Data from
Figure 2 and Table 1 clearly illustrate the over expansion of these
years and its effect on occupancy, income, and rates. While new construc-
tion remained at a constant (high) level between 1969 and 1971, sharp
declines were registered by occupancy (-6.3%), income (-23.8%), and room
rates (-1.4%). New construction then advanced to even higher levels in
1972 and 1973 instead of allowing demand to catch-up. As a consequence,
room rates had to be kept low (they actually declined by an additional
1.8%) and occupancy increased only modestly (not even to the 1964 level).
33
Ibid., p. 293. Holiday Inns also expanded overseas in 1967.
According to then-president Kemmons Wilson this was done as part of a
global mission. Wilson believed: "I think we can do more for world
peace through tourism and building Holiday Inns around the world than
anything else. We get to know other people that way, and they get to
know us, and that's good."
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Incomes per available room failed to make any real gains at all.
Thus the cardinal rule of the lodging industry that new construction
must be predicated on rising occupancies and room rates was broken.
Construction proceeded in anticipation of a rate of increase in demand such
as occurred in the 1960's. Instead, the 1974-75 recession brought a wave
of bankruptcies and foreclosures. The situation was further aggravated by
the fact that new construction continued at its relatively high level in
1974 (as the result of previous commitments) even while occupancy, rates,
and income were plummeting.
The Arab oil embargo of 1973-1974 and ensuing gasoline shortages
severely crippled many road-side operations. Figure 3 traces occupancy
levels for transient hotels, motels with restaurants, and motels without
restaurants. As can be observed, motels without restaurants -- which are
primarily highway locations -- suffered a sharp decline in occupancy
during 1973 even though the all-industry average was moving upward.
The "gas-crisis" of 1973-1974 makes the investment expansion seem even
more surprising.
Several possible explanations may be advanced to explain the invest-
ment glut of 1972-1974. In the first instance, the hotel-motel industry
was merely "following the herd." Aggregate investment in all industries
increased sharply in 1973-1974 despite declining profitability and a
falling volume of internal funds. William L. White offers the following
assessment of this phenomenon:
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To some extent, corporate managers may have been emphasizing
growth and market share goals, and paying relatively little
attention to profitability and cash flows. To some extent, they
may have been temporary misled by the higher levels of reported
profits, despite the erosion of cash flows caused by inflation.
To some extent, they may have believed in the future profit-
ability of this investment, despite the levels of current profit-
ability and the clear signals from financial markets.34
To a large degree, this accurately describes the hotel-motel industry.
With a declining rate of growth in industry receipts, firms emphasized
increasing their market shares. This translated into beating their
competitors to possibly (though still unproven) profitable locations.
"Signals" from the financial markets were, if anything, encouraging
the trend to expansion. Equity capital continued to flow into hotels
and motels via real estate syndicates, partnerships, and REITs. Debt
capital remained freely available through the insurance companies and,
occasionally, through commercial banks as well.*
Hotel-motel developers were busily reaping the benefits from what was
to them the best of both worlds: enthusiastic equity investors and
uncritical lenders.** Real-estate magnate Harry Helmsley put it, perhaps
34
William L. White and Jay Light, The Financial System (Homewood,
Ill.: Irwin, Inc., forthcoming), p. 34.
*The Crocker National Bank, for example, supplied $16 million to
Royal Inns. The chain entered bankruptcy in May, 1975. "The Hotel
Investor Turning Innkeeper." Business Week (May 12, 1975), p. 25.
**According to Stephen W. Brenner: "An oversupply of money was pumped
into the industry, without careful analysis of location and product."
Business Week (May 12, 1975), p. 29.
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more charitably, when he remarked:
Hotel builders are optimists, not economists. If a guy can
get [someone else's] money, he'll build a hotel and hope for the
best.... If over-building is controlled, it will be because of
the lenders.35
The lenders were not controlling. Life insurance companies were
under considerable pressure to invest an ever increasing amount of capital.
By 1973, their annual rate of asset growth approximated $15 billion, or
six percent per year compounded.3 6 During the early 1970's, the insurance
companies turned with increasing frequency to commercial mortgages. By
1973, these instruments accounted for fully 33 percent of net acquisitions
of external financial assets -- up from 20 percent in 1970.37
Insurance company investment analysts were, of course, quite familiar
with hotels and motels by then. Risk was considered to be managable and
return often superior.* Between 1969 and 1975, the fifteen largest
insurance companies regularly surveyed by the American Council of Life
Insurance placed 6.3 percent of their total multi-family and nonresidential
3 5
"No "vacancy' means big profits for U. S. hotels," Business Week
(July 17, 1978) , p. 71.
36
Herbert E. Dougall and Jack Gaumnitz, Capital Markets and Insti-
tutions (Englewood Cliffs: Prentice Hall, 1975), p. 79.
37
From Flow of Funds data, cited by Robert A. Renme, "Investment
Strategy for the Life Insurance Company," in J. David Cummins, editor,
Investment Activities of Life Insurance Companies (Homewood, Ill.: Richard
D. Irwin, Inc., 1977), p. 7.
*These long term assets matched the long term liability structure of
the insurers. High interest rates meant better yield, income participation
clauses offered a hedge against inflation, and higher capitalization rates
and debt coverage ratios provided additional security.
- 114 -
38
investment in hotels and motels.
The actual flow of insurance company capital into hotel-motels be-
came largely dependent upon the yield spread with alternative investments.
The top four alternatives included conventional apartments, office build-
ings, commercial-retailing complexes, and corporate bonds. Of the four,
corporate bonds constituted the most significant competitor since between
20 and 50 percent of life insurance companies' acquisitions were in this
category.
Figure 4 traces the comparative yields for hotel-motel mortgages
and corporate bonds. The total value of new construction contracts was
used as a proxy for insurance company investment in hotels and motels.
The comparison shows that during each period in which hotel yields exceed
corporate bond yields investment flowed into the lodging industry.*
Conversely, investment declined during the periods in which corporate
bonds outperformed hotel mortgages.
The growth of REIT's in the early 1970's also contributed to over-
building. During the period 1969-1972 alone, some $21 billion was pumped
into the REIT's through equity investment and debt capital. By 1973, the
Trusts had invested $1.3 billion in hotels and motels. Of this total,
39
$516 million were in first mortgage construction loans. According to
38
cited in Lawrence D. Jones, "Investment in Income Property Mortgages
by Life Insurance Companies," in Cummins, op. cit., p. 88.
39
National Association of Real Estate Investment Trusts, cited in
Robert Kiener, "REITs: Lodging's latest bedfellows," Lodging Hospitality
(May 1975), p. 47.
*Yield for conventional apartments was higher than hotels in 1976.
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one analyst:
the emergence of REITs had a negative effect on the under-
writing standards applied to new project development.... During
this period, the principal objective of many of the trusts was
to expand their asset bases. In order to do this quickly, the
management of the trusts sought out construction loans without
requiring the existence of take-out permanent financing....
Little attention was paid to the long term viability of
the projects. Such "stupid" competition induced a competitive
response on the part of many banks. The result was massive
overbuilding. The overbuilding in some areas was on such a
scale that it affected both new construction and the existing
seasoned properties.40
While the insurance companies, REITs, and commercial banks stood
willing to pour debt (and some equity) capital in the lodging industry, the
true catalyst for the overbuilding which ensued were the real estate
syndicates and partnerships. Theirs was the so-called "funny-money" which
brought expansionism to a fever pitch. Although their number did not in-
crease drastically over the 1969-75 period (see Table 2 ), their influence
over investment activity was felt in a dramatic fashion.
Table 3 depicts the amount and proportion of total reported industry
receipts for proprietorship, partnership, and corporations for 1969-1975.
The share of the total market captured by partnerships expanded from 11.5
percent in 1972 to 20.1 percent in 1975. During the same three year period
proprietorships lost two percent of the market and corporations declined by
6.6 percent.
40
Howard H. Stevenson, "Equity Real Estate Investments of Life Insurance
Companies," in Cummins, pp. cit., pp. 166-167.
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Table 3
1969-1975 Total Reported Business Receipts; Proprietorships,
Partnerships, Corporations
($1972)
Proprietorships
1,353.0
(15.4)
1,261.3
(13.4)
1,263.8
(14.3)
1,524.9
(14.9)
1,312.9
(12.2)
1,259.2
(11.9)
1,385.3
(12.9)
Partnerships
1,080.3
(12.3)
1,083.1
(11.5)
1,124.8
(12.7)
1,178.6
(11.5)
1,547.2
(14.4)
1,768.5
(16.7)
2,043.2
(20.1)
Corporations
6,338.4
(72.3)
7,086.8
(75.1)
6,465.5
(,73.0)
7,508.8
(73.6)
7,888.4
(73.4)
7,544.0
(71.4)
6,828.0
(67.0)
Source: Internal Revenue Service, Statistics of Income Business Tax
Return (Washington: GPO), 1969-1975.
Year
1969
(%)
1970
(%)
1971
(%)
1972
(%)
1973
(%)
1974
(%)
1975
(%)
Total
8,8771.7
(100.0)
9,431.2
(100.0).
8,845.1
(100.0)
10,212.3
(100.0)
10,748.5
(100.0)
10,571.7
(100.0)
10,181.5
(100.0)
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The rationale for this expansion of partnerships was the attractiveness
of tax shelters provided by the rapid depreciation of hotel structures,
furnishings, and equipment. Partners were buying tax losses which could
then be applied to their ordinary income. This process is clearly illus-
trated in the figures listed below:
Type of Business
Organization
Corporations
Proprietorships
Partnerships
For Years 1969-1975
Cumulative Before Percent Change Percent Change
Tax Net Gain in Number of in Total Industry
(Loss) ($000's) Businesses Receipts
+ $761,225
+ $428,573
- $481,944
-11.3%
- 0.3%
+11.0%
-5.3%
-2.5%
+7.8%
Source: Internal Revenue Service, Statistics of Income, 1969-1975.
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Operating profits were obviously not a prime consideration for new
investment. Moreover, since these are aggregate figures (adding net gains
with losses) they mask the true magnitude of the tax losses generated by
partnerships. IRS data show that for the years 1974-1976, hotel-motel
partnerships registered before tax losses of over one billion dollars*,
which -- if fully utilized -- could have resulted in $500 million of
tax avoidance.
The overbuilding created by generous lenders, enthusiastic developers,
and uncaring investors resulted in falling occupancy, declining income per
available room, and flat room rates. This instability was, of course,
intensified by fluctuations in demand caused by the recession. Another
destablizing force on the industry was the rapid build-up of debt and the
burden of huge interest payments.
The interest expense of all hotel-motel businesses increased yearly
from $471.9 million in 1969 to $1,139.5 million in 1975.41 Interest pay-
ments accounted for 9.06 percent of all industry receipts in 1975, up from
6.25 percent in 1969.
Figure 5 traces the proportion of total business receipts going to
interest for proprietorships, partnerships, and corporations during 1969-
1975. The heaviest burden of debt was sustained by partnerships -- in
*
The figures are ($ millions): 1974 (-$315.9); 1975 (-$384.5); and
1976 (-$306.0). I. R. S. Statistics of Income. These partnerships suc-
ceed only too well in generating tax losses -- the -nurber of partnerships
with losses declined by 778 over the three year span.
41
IRS, Statistics of Income, 1969-1975.
- 120 -
Figure 5
Debt Burden:
Partnerships, Proprietorships, Corporations
1969 - 1975
Interest Payments
As Percent of
Business Receipts
17
15
Partnerships
13
11
Proprietorships
All
09-
07
Corporations
05 e
69 70 71 72 73 74 75
YEAR
Source: Internal Revenue Service, Statistics of Income,
1969-1975.
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1974 an astounding 16.18 percent of all receipts went to interest payments.
This reflects the fact that these deals were all highly leveraged, and that
interest payments (which are deductable expenses) are ordinarily higher in
the earlier years. During 1975 it was found that, if not for the crushing
burden of debt service, many of the newer properties could have broken
even with occupancies as low as 35% (rather than 65%-70% with the interest
expense) .42
Yearly interest payments made by corporations increased by 90.8
percent between 1969 and 1975. This represents a slower rate of growth
than for the industry as a whole. Expressed as a percentage of receipts
(see Figure 5 ) interest payments grew from 5.59 percent in 1969 to 6.91
percent in 1976. However, if we aggregate rent payments with interest
(which is only another form of rent) the difference between corporations
and the rest of the industry becomes much less marked:
Percentage of Total Business Receipts
Interest + Rent Interest
1973 1975 1973 1975
Corporations 12.8 14.7 6.73 6.91
Proprietorships 13.0 14.4 8.56 10.82
Partnerships 24.4 19.6 14.51 15.14
Source: Internal Revenue Service, Statistics of Income.
42
"The Hotel Investor Turning Innkeeper," Business Week (May 12, 1975)
p. 25.
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Proprietorships were not immune from the lure of debt financed expan-
sion. Having tasted the potential for great profits during the boom year
of 1969, proprietorships made increased use of debt capital to improve and
expand their operations. In part this was dictated by higher construction
and operating costs. To a large, albeit unmeasurable, extent, this
development was probably determined by prevailing market conditions.
The tradeoff for the independent proprietorships was that first
they became indebted to finance capitalists; and, second, they became
dependent upon the chains for marketing assistance. As the figures below
indicate, the percentage of total receipts going to net income and interest
remained fairly constant between 1969 and 1976 (with the exception of the
three recession years). However, the distribution between income and
interest became skewed sharply in the favor of lenders.
Percent of Proprietors Business Receipts
Year Net Income Interest Total
(Before tax)
1969 7.5% 7.5% 15.0%
1970 5.3% 7.7% 12.8%
1971 7.1% 7.9% 15.0%
1972 5.5% 8.2% 13.7%
1973 5.2% 8.6% 13.8%
1974 1.1% 9.7% 10.8%
1975 1.5% 10.8% 12.3%
1976 3.6% 11.3% 14.9%
Source: Internal Revenue Service, Statistics of Income, 1969-1976.
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Lenders have clearly assumed a control over a majority of the surplus
being produced by the proprietors. Their proportion of the take increased
steadily throughout the period; the proprietors own share, however, fluctuated
according to business conditions while pursuing an overall downward trend.
Since the debt holders have the preferred (secured) position, proprietors'
control over their own businesses has become increasingly tenuous. They
are, increasingly, working for the finance capitalists.
The net result of the economic insecurity caused by overbuilding,
recession, and excessive debt has become a greater reliance on the
national chains. Operators and lenders alike have come to believe that
the chains, with their extensive marketing and nation-wide reservation
systems, provide greater income security for hotels and motels. The
fact that powerfully entrenched lenders believe this is alone a sufficient
reason to explain the phenomenal growth of the chains over the past nine
years.
Table 6 shows the growth of chain properties and rooms between 1972
and 1977. Much of this growth represents the reorganization of existing
(independent) operations. Numerous national chains actively market their
services to independents as "referral groups." Other chains look for exist-
ing properties which might join their systems as new franchises. While
impossible to fix precisely, we estimate that approximately 38 percent of
total chain growth between 1974 and 1977 can be attributed to
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Table 6
Growth of Chain Properties, Rooms
1972-1977
Chain
Properties
4,999
5,482
6,322
8,667
9,302
10,912
118.3%
Chain
Rooms
754,254
824.810
950,953
1,123,212
1, 158,038
1,276,922
69.3%
Average Rooms/
Chain Property
150.9
150.5
150.4
129.6
124.5
117.2
-22.3%
Source: American Hotel and Motel Association
Table
Chain Properties, Rooms as Percent of U.S. Total
1972-1977
Chain Properties
13.4%
14.6
16.9
23.0
24.6
29.2
Chain Rooms
39.8%
42.5
48.2
56.1
57.2
63.1
Source: American Hotel and Motel Association
Year
1972
1973
1974
1975
1976
1977
% Change
1972-1977
Year
1972
1973
1974
1975
1976
1977
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conversions.. *
The increase in chain affiliated properties follows a pattern which
indicates that growth has been directly attributable to the economic
uncertainty prevelant in the 1970's. Data presented below portray the
yearly percentage changes in industry receipts and chain properties for
1972 and 1973. A comparison shows a strong negative correlation (-.876),
indicating that property owners flock to the chains when economic times
turn bad.
Percent Change From the Preceeding Year
Year Hotel-Motel Receipts** Chain Properties
1973 3.72 9.35
1974 -1.09 15.29
1975 1.73 18.11
1976 8.43 3.10
1977 2.79 10.26
correlation coefficient = (-.876)
*
We base our estimate on the following assumptions: average cost/room
($1972) of $15,000- total new construction expenditures ($1972) of $3,300
million (see Table 1 ); total chain growth of 325,000 rooms. Assuming that
90 percent of new construction went to chain properties, this gives us a
"shortfall" (not explained by new construction) of 125,000 rooms. We assume
that these were conversions. The total stock of non-chain rooms declined
by 275,000 during the period. If our assumptions are reasonable, this
would suggest that 150,000 rooms were lost through demolition, fire, or
conversion to other uses, and 125,000 were absorbed by the chains.
**These figures are from the Bureau of Domestic Commerce, deflated
to $1972.
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Chapter V: Economic Trends in New England
The hotel-motel industry services travel,'and travel has always
been an important facet of American life. Before America was a nation
it was a destination. In the post-war era, the development of new
marketing techniques and advanced electronic communications systems have
precluded the necessity of a portion of domestic and international
travel. Nevertheless, the period has witnessed an intensification of
both business and recreational travel. The volume of domestic
intercity passenger traffic has approximately tripled since 1950 to
some 1,441 billion passenger miles in 1976.
Travel is clearly the most immediate source of demand for the
lodging industry. Total receipts in the hotel-motel industry are
largely dependent on the volume of intercity travel. As Table 1
shows, industry receipts per passenger mile have varied only slightly
since 1954, increasing from 750 (1972 dollars)/mile in 1954 to 790
(1972 dollars)/mile in 1976.
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Table 1
Total Traffic 'Volume and Hotel-Motel Receipts
For Selected Years and 1972-1977
Domestic Intercity
Traffic Volume
(Billions of Passenger Miles)
673
760
853
1,021
1,300
1,356
1,331
1,352
1,441
Hotel-Motel
Receipts
(Thousands of
$ 1972)
5,073
5,676
6,509
8,029
10,088
10,463
10,349
10,528
11,413
Receipts/
Passenger Mile
.750
.750
.760
.790
.780
.770
.780
.780
.79W
Source: For traffic data: Statistical Abstract of the United States, 1978,
1970 (Washington: Goverment Printing Office) , table 1070 (1978),
table 824 (1970).
For Hotel-Motel receipts: See page 46.
Year
1954
1958
1963
1967
1972
1973
1974
1975
1976
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Purpose of Travel
A comparison of New England with other regions based on the 1972 National
Travel Survey and 1972 Census of Selected Service Industries yields some
rather significant results. For the United States as a whole, the distribu-
tion of trips by main purpose is fairly evenly divided between visiting
friends and relatives (31.6%), business and convention (31.8%), and all
other reasons (31.6%),. New England receives significantly less business and
and convention travel (24.4%), and much more travel for "other" purposes
(44.0%).
Among all regions, New England had the lowest proportion of trips for
business and convention purposes, and the highest share for outdoor re-
creation:
Table 2
Percent Distribution by Main Purpose of Trip
Visit Friends Business and Outdoor
Region and Relatives Convention Recreation
U. S. 31.6% 31.8% 10.0%
New England 30.8% 24.4% 15.2%
New Jersey/New York 30.4% 36.3% 7.5%
Mid-Atlantic 34.3% 33.5% 9.4%
South 32.7% 34.1% 7.1%
North Central 35.3% 31.1% 10.9%
Northwest 27.1% 36.0% 11.9%
Southwest 34.2% 31.8% 9.0%
Pacific 27.8% 31.4% 12.1%
Other
26.6%
29.9%
25.7%
22.8%
26.1%
22.7%
25.0%
25.0%
28.7%
Source: Bureau of the Census, National Travel Survey, 1972.
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This distribution (by purpose) of trip has had a very important impact
on the lodging industry in New England. Trips conducted for business and
convention purposes contribute proportionately more nights in commercial
establishments than in other types of accomodations. New England's smaller
share of business and convention trips has resulted in a much lower
percentage of total overnight stays in commercial establishments (27%) when
compared to the U. S. as a whole (34%). This lower level of demand for
commerical lodging is also partially due to the fact that, proportionately,
twice as many visitors to the region use their own cabins and trailers:
U. S.
New England
Table 3
Overnight Accomodations (To/Through New England)
Percent Distribution of Person Nights By
Where Night Is Spent: U. S. and New England
Commercial Friends and Own Cabin or
Establishment Relatives Trailer Other
34% 47% 13% 5%
27% 42% 26% 6%
Source: National Travel Survey, 1972.
Total
100%
100%
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Seasonality of Demand
Because of a relatively smaller business and convention demand, and
despite the relative preponderance of cabins and trailers, New England inn-
keepers have oriented themselves more towards the recreational segment
of the lodging market. Fifty-three percent of all commerical establishments
in New England describe themselves as "resorts" compared to only 26% in
the U. S. as a whole. These establishments are generally smaller than the
national average, and face a demand for services which is much more seasonal.
As Table 4 illustrates, in 1972 New England experienced twice as much
variability in total person-nights spent in commercial lodging as did the
U. S. as a whole. It is the most seasonal region in the U. S., with peak
demand in the third (summer) quarter equalling 4.1 times that of the first
quarter (see Table 5).
Table 4
Seasonality by Season
Total Person
Region Nights (000,s) Variability*
U. S. 606,539 
.404
New England 25,079 .795
New York/New Jersey 34,621 
.611
Mid-Atlantic 42,819 ,465
South 148,326 
.264
North Central 72,256 
.479
Northwest 31.286 
.630
Southwest 63,323 
.334
Pacific 90,588 
.276
*
coefficient of variation
Source: National Travel Survey, 1972.
New England
New England as
Percent of
U. S.
- 131 -
Table 5
Person-Nights 'in Commercial Establishments
By Quarter, 1972
I_ II III IV
3,340 4,375 13,719 3,645
2.92 3.09 5.69 3.33
Source: National Travel Survey, 1972.
This seasonal fluctuation is due, in part, to climatic conditions, and
partially because of an industrial and school schedule set during an earlier
agriculturally dominated epoch. In any event, the strongest effect of
seasonality on recreationally orient hotels-motels is that it requires a
higher profit margin during the peak season in order to carry the business
during slower (or closed) months.
Seasonality and Establishment Size
The vulnerability of any given enterprise to a single "bad season" is
directly dependent upon the amount of fixed costs carried by the business:
capital charges, operating expenses (i.e. heat, maintenance) and taxes
Total
25,079
4.13
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Sufficient revenues must be generated to cover these fixed costs; otherwise,
the business faces bankruptcy or reorganization.
Generally speaking, larger hotel-motel enterprises carry higher fixed
costs than smaller businesses and are therefore more vulnerable to seasonal
variability in demand. As we have seen in Chapter Four, this is not universally
true for all hotel-motels. Larger enterprises often have access to a line
of credit which is unavailable to smaller businesses. In addition, small
proprietorships have become increasingly burdened with larger fixed debt
costs, and some large projects have been able to reduce their fixed costs
through various public programs. Nevertheless, as industry accounting
data clearly shows, fixed costs tend to be larger on a per available room
basis, for larger properties:
Cost
Category
Undistributed
Operating
Expenses
Property Taxes
and Insurance
Total
Table 6
Two Categories of Fixed Costs: Median
Amounts Per Available Room
Size of Property
Under 150 150-299 300-600
rooms rooms rooms
$2336
344
$2680
$2353
387
$2740
$3265
551
$3816
Source; Laventhol and Horwarth, U. S, Lodging Industry,
(Philadelphia, 1978).
1978 Edition
Over 600
rooms
$3969
720
$4689
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Decisions based on these three inter-connected factors -- seasonality
of demand, vulnerability of larger enterprises to seasonality, and proport-
ionately smaller businesses and convention market -- are largely responsible
for keeping down the size of the average operation in New England. The
average number of rooms for all establishments with payroll in 1972 was
39.8 in New England versus 48.8 in the U. S. The New England region had the
smallest proportion of establishments with over 100 rooms (7.7%), and among
the largest percentage of enterprises with less than 25 guestrooms (49.8%)
(see Table 8).
Types of Operations
As Table 8 shows, the size effect is translatable into the various
types of hotel-motel operations in the region. Only small hotels are
"larger" than the national average. Hotels with over 25 rooms in New England
are 78% of the average size, receive 75% of the average revenue per room,
and only 10% of the average total receipts per establishment. Not surpris-
ingly, large hotels are proportionately less important as a source of receipts
to the industry in the region (36.4% of all receipts in New England versus
46.4% in the nation).
In New England the hotel has been surpassed in certain respects by
the motor hotel. Motor hotels in New England are larger, on average, than
hotels (contrary to figures on the national level). Compared to hotels,
they receive 46% more receipts per establishments, and earn 45% more
revenue per available room. The motor hotel exceeds the national average
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Table 7
Distribution of Establishments by Room Size, 1972
Percent of All Establisments within Region
Less Than
Region 25 25-49 50-99 100+ Total
New England
Middle Atlantic
East North Central
West North Central
South Atlantic
East South Central
West South Central
Mountain
Pacific
U.S.A.
49.8
40.5
49.4
54.4
43.4
43.3
44.5
50.7
44.2
46.2
28.6
30.5
25.0
26.2
27.0
27.6
29.3
30.3
31.8
28.5
13.8
15.4
12.3
10.0
14.8
14.1
13.4
11.2
13.3
13.3
7.7 99.9*
13.6 100.0
13.3 100.0
9.4 100.0
14.8 100.0
15.1 100.1*
12.8 100.0
7.8 100.0
10.3
11.9
99.9*
99.9*
*Differs from 100.0 due to rounding.
Source: Census of Selected Service Industries, 1972.
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Table 8
Types of Operations: New England and the U. S., 1972
Hotels, 25
Rooms or
More
Types of Operation
Hotels, 25
Rooms or
Less
Motels,
Tourist
Courts
Motor Total
Hotels
Distribution of:
Establishments
New England
U. S.
Rooms
New England
U. S.
Receipts
New England
U. S.
Average:
Rooms Per
Establish.
New England
U. S.
17.8
18.1
33.0
35.2
36.4
46.4
11.0
8.2
4.2
2.6
3.6
1.9
74.7
95.2
Receipts (000 's)
Per Establish.
New England $368.1
U. S. 618.1
Receipts Per
Room
New England $4,931
U. S. $6,492
15.8
15.6
$ 61.2
54.2
$3,878
$3,475
65.5
67.9
52.1
51.8
42.8
39.2
31.3
37.3
$ 115.1
139.0
$3,672
$3,727
5.6 99.9*
5.7 99.9*
10.7 100.0
10.3 99.9*
17.1 100.0
12.6 100.1*
75.0 39.8
87.8 48.8
$ 535.9 $178.00
522.7 240.8
$7,144 $4,469
$5,987 $4,928
*
Differs from 100.00 due to rounding.
Source: Census of Selected Service Industries, 1972.
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in receipts. per available room. We. can attribute the performance of this
type of operation to several factors -- motor hotels are generally newer
than hotels (although some are converted hotels) , are located on major
highways (with an identifiable local demand as well), and are usually
within metropolitan areas.,
The particular success of the motor when when compared to the hotel
in New England, is tied to the fact that travellers depend on the auto-
mobile more heavily in New England than in any other region. According
to the National Travel Survey (1972) 79.9 percent of all trips to New
England were made by automobile, compared to a national average of 72.5
percent.
Establishment Size and Competition
An inter-regional comparison based on the 1972 Census shows that
lodging industry receipts are much less concentrated among larger firms
in New England than in other areas. Both New England and the Mountain
states, for example, have approximately the same proportion of larger
(over 100 guestroom) establishments. Yet, these larger enterprises account
for 73.3 percent of all receipts collected in the Mountain region versus
only 50.4 percent in New England (the national average is 68.2 percent).
This means that there is a wider potential market available to smaller
firms in New England.
Competition among New England's smaller firms for this wider market
appears to be intense. The form that this competition takes is perhaps
more visible in terms of the range of facilities offered (product dif-
ferntiation) than in a highly competitive rate structure (the exception
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being the budget motels.). This tends to put an additional capital require-
ment on New England firms., Hotel-inotels in New Englnad are more likely to
have swimming pools, restaurants, and public meeting rooms than their
national counterparts. It is unclear as to whether or not these additional
facilities. actually produce more revenue. The industry in New England
has 2.1% -more establishment with. public meeting rooms for a market share
which is 2.5% smaller. Yet, to compete effectively in a given area,
firms. feel that they must have these facilities. Similiarly, swimming
pools may be rarely used, but popular thinking is that guests desire to
know that such a facility is available.
Facility
Swimming Pc
Public Room
Meetings, e
Restaurants
Table 9
Facilities Available: U. S.
% of Establish-
ments with Facility
New England U. S.
ol 55.9 51.1
Ls for
tc. 29.2
42.1
27.1
37.5
and New England,
% Revenues in
with Facility
New England
78.4
76.4
89.9
1972
Establishments
U. S.
77.7
78.9
85.4
Source: Census of Selected Services Industries, 1972.
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Competition seems to be especially keen in the recreational sector.
In the New England region in 1972, there was a relatively larger number
of firms competing for the' resort dollar than in the U. S, as a whole.
As has been mentioned previously, 53.6 percent of all New England establish-
ments designated themselves as "resorts," compared to 26.0 percent of the
national total. However, the difference between the proportion of total
receipts captured by these establishments on the regional and national
level is much. narrower. In New England, those 53.6 percent of all
establishments (resorts) were chasing after only 29.7 percent of regional
receipts; while in the U. S. 26.0 percent of all establishments designated
as resorts received 27.2 percent of industry revenues.
Data show that New England resorts are much smaller than their
national counterparts (average receipts per resort establishment in New
England are only 39 percent of the national average). Conversely, how-
ever, establishments which- are not "resorts" (those aimed at primarily
business trade, or a combination of business and recreational markets)
tend to be larger in New England. This is consistent with our earlier
assertion that the extreme seasonality of recreational demand in New
England increases risk for larger establishments with higher fixed costs.
Usage (i.e., recreational/non-recreation) is a relatively more important
factor in determining the size of any given establishment in New England
than in the U. S. Usage is based on seasonality, which influences risk,
which is an important factor in determining size.
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Table 1Q
Comparison of Resort aid Non-Resort Establishments;
New England and U. S. , 1972
All
Establishments Resorts Non-Resorts
Percentage of
Establishments:
New England 100.0 53.6 46.4
United States 100.0 27.2 72.8
Percentage of
Receipts:
New England 100.0 29.7 70.3
United States 100.0 27.2 72.8
Average Receipt
per Establishment:
($000's)
New England $ 178.0 $ 98.8 $ 269.3
United States $ 240.8 $ 252.2 $ 236.8
New England/United States .74 .39 1.14
Source: Census of Selected Service Industries, 1972.
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Growth of the Industry Across the Nation
Although hotels-motels constitute a growth industry of some signi-
ficance within the New England region, their importance on the national
level is much less striking. As Table 11 illustrates, New England is
the third slowest growth region in the country. The 1958-1972 growth
rate in New England is approximately 71 percent of the national rate,
and only 31 percent of the fastest growing (Mountain states) region.
Moreover, the data presented in Tablell show that the market share of
the New England region declined by 0.7 percent in the 1958-1972 period.
Between 1958 and 1972 the distribution of industry receipts became
altered along the lines of the snowbelt/sunbelt split. In the aggregate,
the North last approximately 12 percent of the total lodging dollar to
the Southern regions. Whereas in 1958 the North captured 51.3 percent
of all lodging receipts, that total has shrunk to 39.5 percent in 1972.
During this timeframe, the South. and West grew at a rate equalling 3.4
times that of the North (116 percent for the South and West versus 34
percent for the North).
This regional shift in the lodging industry can be attributed, in
part, to the relative growth of the sunbelt in total population and income.
However, as Howard Morgan noated in his 1964 treatise, "the fortunes of
the industry are not as closely related to population and income changes
of the region in which they are located as might be true of the other
service industries."1 This is because hotels and motels depend on
1Howard E. Morgan, The Motel Industry in the United States: Small
Business in Transition (Tucson: Bureau of Business and Public Research,
University of Arizona, 1964), p. 31.
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Table 11
Distribution of Receipts by Region
1958-1972: Hotels, Motels, Tourist Courst, Camps
Percent of U.
1958 1963
S. Total
1967 1972
Change 1958-
1972
Northeast
New England
Middle Atlantic
Total Northeast
North Central
East North Central
West North Central
Total North Central
South
South Atlantic
East South Central
West South Central
Total South
West
Mountain
Pacific
Total West
Total
5.8
22.7
28.5
15.6
7.2
22.8
15.9
3.4
6.8
26.1
8.5
14.1
22.6
5.7
21.5
27.2
14.5
6.8
21.3
16.2
3.4
6.9
26.5
9.5
15.5
25.0
100.0 100.1
5.4
18.9
24.3
14.0
6.5
20.5
17.7
3.7
7.3
28.7
10.7
15.7
26.4
5.1
15.4
20.5
12.5
6.5
19.0
20.4
4.2
7.7
32.3
13.0
15.2
28.2
99.9* 100.0
-0.7
-7.3
-8.0
-3.1
-0.7
-3.8
0.8
0.9
6.2
4.5
1.1
5.6
0.0
0.0
*Differs from 100.0 due to rounding
Source: Census of Selected Service Industries, selected years.
Region
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mobility and -- to a large degree *- inter-regional travel, In 1972, the
South, Northwest, and Pacific sections of the country received a net inflow
(region as destination minus region as origin) of 19.9 million person
trips. The growth of the lodging industry in the sunbelt, therefore, can be
primarily ascribable to those developments which have faciliated inter-
regional travel -- specifically the Interstate Highway System and the
growth of the air transportation network. The growth of these transporta-
tion systems coincided with the expansion of vacation time during the
1960's to give the four-season sunbelt a distinct advantage in attracting
customers to its lodging facilities. In addition, the convention market,
which had previously been concentrated in Chicago and New York, spread to
secondary cities, including those in the sunbelt.
The growth of hotels and motels in New England suffered from the
fact that the two major transportation developments had a relatively
less favorable impact on the industry in the region. Between 1962 and
1977, New England's share of completed miles of the Interstate Highway
system declined from 4.7 percent to 4.1 percent. Since the industry
in New England is relatively more dependent on auto-travellers , and since
the expansion of the Interstate Highway System increased the substitut-
ability of travel to other regions; the net effect of national highway
development on New England was probably less favorable when compared to
other areas of the country. This seems particularly true in view of
the fact that, in 1972, New England had the highest proportion of travel-
lers (41.3%) whose round-trip distance was less than 400 miles of any
region in the country.
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The lodging industry in New England -- more than any other section
- s.erves a regionally local market. While this characteristic has
tended to work against New England during periods of tremendous economic
growth (particularly the 1960tY, it serves the region well during "dull"
times. During recessionary periods, a family is less likely to drop
vacation plans calling for a trip of 400 miles than they would for a
journey of several thousand miles. Moreover, the industry in New England
seems less likely to suffer from any reduction of long-distance highway
travel caused by higher gasoline prices or fuel shortages. The New
England vacation may prove to be a more attractive alternative during
the "energy crisis."
The story is much less ambiguous. with respect to air travel. Between
1960 and 1976 the share of domestic inter-city passenger traffic (measured
in passenger-miles) via domestic airways increased from 4.33 percent to
11.45 percent.2 New England received proportionately fewer trips by
means of this mode of transportation than any other region. Furthermore,
air travel resulted in a much lower percentage of overnight stays in
commercial accomodations (27%) than for the U. S. as a whole (47%). Thus,
it appears probable that the lodging industry in New Englnad (when compared
to other regions), has not realized significant increases in revenues
as the result of the recent movement towards discount airfares and
increased air travel.
2Bureau of the Census, Statistical Abstract, 1978, Table 1670.
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On a basic structural level, it appears as if the growth of the
large recreational segment of the New- England lodging industry has,
ironically, been constrained by its own success. Growth-in this sector
of the industry has -- in the'past -- generally meant increased revenues
during the third (summer) quarter. This accentuates seasonality and
makes the enterprise appear, from the investment standpoint, to be even
more risky. This becomes particularly important when owners approach
institutional lenders for debt capital to finance expansion or new con-
struction. Many New England innkeepers are placed into a Catch-22 type
situtation. Those entrepreneurs seeking large loans on the basis of
actual or projected revenues which peak sharply in a single season may
be rejected as being too risky by large lenders (i.e., insurance companies)
who will not finance projects under some minimum size (i.e., 100 guestroom) .
Conversely, they may be refused by smaller, local lenders who
consider large hotel-motel projects to be either too expansive for the
institutions own resources, or who wish to diversify away from that
type of investment.
In cases such as these, hotel-motel entrepreneurs are constrained
more by the amount of personal collateral they can bring to bear than
by the growth potential of their businesses. This tends to put a "cap"
on the productive capacity of the industry. As the following table shows,
this phenomonon seems to have occured in New Hampshire and Vermont.
During 1963-1972, motels in these two states achieved a receipt/room
ratio approximately equalling the national average, but saw their room/
establishment ratio fall rather sharply when compared to the average
for the total U. S. By way of comparison, establishments in South
- 145 -
Carolina -- a state not affected to the nearly same degree by seasonality
of demand -- increased in average size to a figure well above the nation
average, though with a receipt/room ratio approximately the same as
New Hampshire and Vermont (the least seasonal New England state in 1977).
Ratio of State Average to
U. S. Average for:
Average Rooms/ Average
Establish- -.Receipts/ Rooms/Estab- Receipts/
ment Rooms lishments Rooms
1963 1972 1963 1972 1963 1972 1963 1972
U. S.
Vermont
New
Hampshire
South
Carolina
25.4 37.3 $1,923 $3,7
18.7 26.1 1,700 3,6
27
12
21.0 25.3 1,852 3,540
19.3 41.7 1,461 3,593
.73
.83
.70
.68
.88
.96
.76 1.11 .76
Source: Census of Selected Service Industries, 1972.
.96
.95
.96
al
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Characteristics of the Industry in New England and Criteria for Investment
1. Size and Chain Affiliation
As we observed in Chapter 4, the capital market for hotel and motels
is highly segmented. Insurance companies, the primary source of capital for
the industry, invest only in large properties with chain affiliation. Since
the industry in New England consists primarily of small properties, it has
less access to this important source of capital. State finance agencies
have been set up in Maine and Rhode Island, but much of their capital
has gone into larger projects as well.
An analysis of census and industry data shows that New England has the
lower proportion of establishments which are chain affiliates. (see Table
12 ). In 1972 only 8.1 percent of establishments in the region were chain
properties. Looking only at motels and motor hotels, we note that, again,
New England has a significantly lower percentage of chain rooms, receipts,
and establishments.
Data for 1975-1977 indicates that the growth rate for chain expansion
in other regions may be slowing. For example the number of chain properties
in the Mountain region grew by 137 percent between 1973 and 1975, but by
only 36.1 percent in the 1975-1977 period. New England, on the other hand,
seems to be growing at a relatively more rapid rate (32.0 percent and 37.7
percent for the two periods).
The reason for this new growth of chain properties in New England
appears to be twofold: (1) other regions are becoming progressively more
saturated with chain properties; and (2) there are fewer large properties
available for chain aquisition because existing properties are already
affiliated, and because existing properties are already affiliated, and
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Table 12
Chain Concentration By Region, 1972
Region
New England
South Atlantic
Pacific
East North Central
West North Central
Middle Atlantic
Mountain
West North Central
East South Central
Number of
Chain
Properties
217
1212
695
689
529
521
380
356
400
Percent of All
Establishments With
Payroll in Region
8.1%
15.2
11.5
13.4
14.4
10.5
8.6
9.4
18.8
Total Est
Total Rec
Total Roo
Table 13
Chain Concentration, Motels and Motor Hotels
U.S. and New England
U.S. New
ablishments 14.3
eipts 50.4
ms 36.1
England
8.4
36.1
24.5
Source: American Hotel and Motel Association, Census of Selected
Service Industries, 1972.
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because the slowdown in new construction caused by the oversupply of the
early 1970's.
The latter explanation for chain growth is evidenced by the progres-
sively declining size of chain properties in the U.S. and New England:
Average Number of Rooms Per Chain Property
1972 1973 1974 1975 1976 1977
U.S. 150.9 150.5 150.4 129.6 124.5 117.0
N.E. 134.2 137.5 126.3 126.3 131.3 110.3
To a greater extent this shrinkage undoubtably reflects the economic
insecurity experienced by indspendent operators during the 1974-1975
recession. Moreover, the actual value of chain affiliation for smaller
properties in accessing private capital appeats problematic at best. The
owner of one hotel in Western Massachusetts stated in an interview that:
$3,000 in initiation fees and chain membership not only failed to open
banker's doors, but gained him only 30 reservations over the full year.
2. Market Growth
Past trends in market growth are often used as indicators of future
performance. By this standard, New England is a poor performer. Table 13
and Figure 1 display the growth in industry receipts over the 1954-1972
period. The New England region has failed to grow as rapidly as the national
average during any of the four time periods surveyed. The regional growth
rate ranked New England fifth (out of nine) during the 1954-1958 period,
but dropped back to seventh during 1967-1972.
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Table 13
Growth of Receipts by Region 1965-1972
Hotels, Morels, Tourist Courts, Camps
Receipts ($1972)
Region
North East
New England
Middle Atlantic
Total North East
North Central
East North Central
West North Central
Total North Central
South
South Atlantic
East South Central
West South Central
Total South
West
Mountain
Pacific
Total West
U. S. Total
Camps account for appr
1954
311
1,281
1,592
910
404
1,314
776
178
391
1,346
390
671
1.061
5,132
oximately 7
1958
355
1,391
1,746
955
438
1,393
966
206
417
1,592
517
863
1,380
6,111
percent of
the UnitedS
1963
404
1,512
1,916
1,022
477
1,499
1,142
241
483
1,866
669
1,091
1,760
7,042
the total
1967
486
1,692
2,178
1,253
582
1,835
1,585
329
651
2,565
956
1,401
2,357
8,933
receipts.
1972
542
1,638
2,180
1,333
687
2,020
2,174
446
819
3,439
1,387
1,612
2,999
10,638
Source: Statistical Abstract of States, selected years.
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Figure 1
Change in Receipts By
Hotels, Motels, Camps
1954 - 1972
46
44
42
40
Percent 38
Change 36
34
32
30
28
26
24
22
20
18
16
14
12
10
8
6
4
2
0
-2
-3
-4
-5
1954-
1958
1958-
1963
1963-
1967
Mountain
South Atlantic
East South Central
West South Central
United States
West North Central
Pacific
New England
East North Central
Middle Atlantic
1967-
1972
Source: See Table 13.
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When compared to the national average, New England's. greatest
lag period occurred during the 1963 - 1967 period. This was also the
greatest period of road building under the Interstate Highway Act. As
was mentioned earlier, the.region's reliance on the automobile seems
to constitute a relative disadvantage during boom times.
Figure 2 shows the relative growth of receipts within the region.
Vermont, the most recreationally oriented state, experienced the most
rapid rate of growth. This reflects the expansion of the ski industry
over the years.
The erratic growth pattern exhibited by Connecticut reflects
business cyclicality. The lodging industry in Connecticut is New
England's most busines-demand oriented. According to the 1972 Census,
Connecticut accounted for 5.6 percent of total receipts. The sharp
decrease in business activity in 1972 compared to 1967 was mirrored by
a decline in real growth of the hotel-motel industry in that state.
3. Profitability
Because of the fixed cost structure of the lodging industry,
profits tend to vary with occupancy and dollar volume. As a rough
indicator of regional profitability, we have used the "profit" rate
(defined as income before capital charges as a proportion of total
revenue) as reported by firms to industry accountants. We then
applied these rates to regional sales volume reported by the Census
Bureau. Unfortunately, the accounting firm has aggregated New England
with the Middle Atlantic states.
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Figure 2
Growth in Total Receipts, Hotels, Motels, Camps
1954 - 1977
(1954 = 100)
280
260
240
220
200 U. S.
180 /
160
140li
120
100
54 58 63 67 72
YEAR
CT
77
Source: Census of Selected Service Industries, selected years.
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The results of these calculations are displayed in Figure 3 . To
partially test the validity of this approach, the total income figure
was compared with the pre-tax income total (plus depreciation and
interest) as reported by the IRS in Statistics of Income. Results
show that the total income figure reported by the IRS is remarkably
close (1.96 billion) to the figure arrived at through our method (1.97
billion).
Figure 3 shows that the New England and Middle Atlantic region has
declined from being the top income producer in 1958 to a position in
1972 which is fourth out of five regions. Total income (measured in
1972 dollars) in the region was only 4.6 percent higher in 1972 than
it had been in 1958. Total income in the nation increased by 62
percent over the same period.
An examination of IRS data for proprietorships within the New
England states shows us a picture which is somewhat different from the
aggregate. These are primarily small establishments whose average
yearly revenues range from $15 thousand to $16 thousand. During the
years 1972 - 1974, these establishments generated proportionately
more net income than their national counterparts. In 1974, proprietor-
ships in four New England states (Massachusetts, New Hampshire, Vermont,
and Maine) had a net income of $9.5 million, up 50 percent from the
previous year. Aggregate net income for the nation's lodging proprietor-
ships was only $21.6 million in 1974, down 76 percent from the previous
year. This reflects the strength of the regional market.
- 154 -
Figure 3
Estimated Income1 By Region:
Hotels, Motels, Motor Hotels and Camps,
Selected Years
$ 600
a pnac ?aific
loo'p 0
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i v 
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W 
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0
58 63 F 7
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1 Refers to income after property taxes but before capital charges.
Source: Census of Selected Service Industries, selected years, and
Trends in the Hotel-Motel Business (New York: Harris,
Kerr, Forster and Co.), selected years.
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It was not until 1975, when the recession deepened in New England,
that local proprietors sustained losses. At that point, New Englanders
were so deeply affected by the 1975 economic slowdown that they put
off their vacation plans.
The response on the part of many proprietors to bad times is to
close down entirely for the year (or season). Data for Maine proprietor-
ships show this pattern clearly. Maine was hit hard by the gas crisis
in 1973 (which seems to have actually helped business in southern
Vermont and New Hampshire), and again by the recession in 1975. The
numbers of reporting proprietorships varied in the following manner:
1972 -- 1847; 1973 -- 1170; 1974 -- 1802; 1975 -- 1014.
Proprietors can easily afford to shut down since they have very
few carrying costs (although some proprietors employ caretakers during
the off-season). If and when proprietors assume larger fixed costs --
either through debt, franchise fees, or other expenses involved in
supporting a larger establishment -- they would no longer have the
luxury of closing at will. A portion of the lodging industry's risk
would have been shifted onto them, and they would have no choice but
to give up their independence.
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Capital Labor Substitution
In the lodging industry, the total proportion of receipts going to
both capital and labor has remained fairly constant between 1958 and 1977.
Measured as total industrial income without capital consumption adjustments,
3
this figure has held at 52%-54% throughout the seventeen year period.
The relative distribution of returns to labor and capital have fluctuated
according to the movement of occupancy rates. During both 1963 and 1972,
two years in which the occupancy rate was nearly the same (67.0% and 67.4%
respectively), labor (total payroll) accounted for 30% of all industry
receipts.
For reasons discussed more fully in Chapter 4 , we know that new
claims have been placed on total industrial income. These include an
explosion of debt service, various income participation agreements, incen-
tive fees, and other expenses not directly related to operations. In
addition, payroll taxes and social security payments have increased sharply
over the past decade; and increases in the minimum wage have been cause
for additional pressure on the distribution of total income. Historically,
room rates have been able to drift upward to satisfy these additional
claims. However, periodic overbuilding, competition, price elasticity of
demand, changes in the business cycle, and demands for high rates of
profitability all act to maintain the tension between capital and labor
over the distribution of the income pie.
3 The ratios are: 1958 (.52); 1963 (.53); 1967 (.52); 1972 (.53); and
1977 (.54). Sources: Statistical Abstract of the United States, various
years; Census of Selected Service Industries 1958, 1963, 1967, 1972; and
Bureau of Domestic Commerce, 1978.
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Seen in this context, new capital investment (as opposed to capital
replacement) is oriented either to: (1) expand the base of production
so as to further the accumulation of profits; or (2) gain an edge in the
distributional conflict with labor. The nature of production profitability
and financial manipulations were discussed in Chapter 2 and Chapter 3.
It is to the latter purpose that we now turn our attention.
In Chapter One, we observed that the growth of motels and motor
hotels represented a long term trend towards less labor-intensive types
of operations.* The proportion of total receipts going to labor was 12%
to 26% less for motels and motor hotels than for hotels. Budget motels
had even lower requirements. These lower labor costs -- coupled with
a lower initial per/room construction cost -- made motels relatively
more desirable investments than hotels. Once motels were tested in the
market, the major chains, which had previously confined their operations
to hotels, shifted their attention (and capital) to motels. Lenders were
amenable to this change, since lower labor costs meant higher debt coverage
and greater security of investment.
*This fact did not go unnoticed by organized labor. The Hotel and Rest-
aurant Employees Union noted: "Just as automation is forcing the machine-
building unions to effect a revolution in their own thinking, so are these
changes [motel expansion] in our industry requiring that we change our
thinking, too." (Catering Employee, August 1957, p. 22.) George Meany
expressed the opinion that "What's a motel? Why it's just a spread out
hotel!" (Catering Employee, November 1958) ant.. the HREU was "faced with
the greatest organizing challenge since the thirties." Most motel workers
remain unorganized today.
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Within hotels and motels themselves there has been a movement away
from some of the more labor intensive activities (i.e., in-house restaurants),
and some elimination of services (i.e., room service). Increasing "product-
ivity" is seen as another avenue to keep down labor costs. As one industry
consultant reports:
Employee productivity has.. .become a major hospitality manage-
ment concern. Since it is unlikely that management can pay specific
workers less, when it is already paying the minimum wage, manage-
ment has to seek ways of improving their output.4
Historically, "improving their output" has meant either capital investment
in labor-saving equipment, or devising new management techniques to "increase
worker efficiency." In addition, the use of disposable products, such as
paper dinnerware, has increased as their relative costs decline and quality
improves. This serves to free hotel-motel workers from some repetitive
operations and reduce labor costs.
Automation has come slowly to the lodging industry since Ellsworth
Statler installed the first circulating ice water in his hotels.* Today,
direct dialing from guest rooms reduces the need for switchboard operators,
automatic elevators eliminate the elevator man, and vending machines (includ-
ing automated systems for dispensing beverages in the guest's rooms) have
Bruce H. Axler, Management of Hospitality Operations (Indianapolis:
Bobbs-Merril Company, Inc., 1976), p. 109.
*According to Statler, "90 percent of the calls are for a bellboy to bring
ice water. With ice water in their room, we can cut down on the service
staff. Also the guest is spared the annoyance of having to tip the bellboy."
Donald E. Lundberg, The Hotel and Restaurant Business (Boston: Cahners Books,
1976), p. 260.
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5
lessened the need for room service.
Perhaps the greatest developments have been made in the kitchen areas.
Howard Johnson pioneered the use of convenience frozen foods in his road-
side restaurants. This technique quickly spread to hotel restaurants as
well. This eliminated the need for food pepraration workers and effectively
"deskilled" the job of cook. As Donald E. Lundberg notes:
Commissary freezing was a milestone in large restaurant opera-
tions. It permitted impressive economies in restaurant labor. As
early as 1963, Howard Johnson supervisors were being told that it
was no longer necessary to hire cooks, only food warmers. In fact,
food preparation in Johnson restaurants has been restricted to
griddling, frying, and baking.
Teenagers have been griddle and fry cooks. No intricate
reci-es need he followed for preparing food. Instead of paying
$200 and more a week for a chef, the minimum wage is paid for a
kitchen preparation staff. If a "food warmer" decides to leave,
another person can be trained in a few days to take his place. 6
5
James A. Urisko, "Productivity in hotels and motels, 1958-1973,"
Monthly Labor Review (May 1975), p. 26.
6
Lundberg, op. cit., p. 291. Eliminating certain job descriptions has
also enabled employers to keep down labor costs. This had been done at the
lofty Mount Washington Hotel (a far cry from Howard Johnson's). As the New
York Times (July 22, 1979, p. F3) reports: "Labor costs have further eroded
profits. An average waiter will earn $220 a week; a bartender, $100 more.
'When you have to raise the dishwasher, you have to raise the chef,' says
Angelo Accarino, food and beverage manager. So Mr. Accarino has blurred
the division of labor somewhat among 48 employees in his 5,000 square-foot
kitchen. A 50-year hotel veteran, he said he once employed more cooks. But
in those days, he recalled, Your fry cook does nothing but fry. Your roast
cook does nothing but roast. Well, I cut that out. I call them cooks.'"
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Capital investment in physical design changes have been made in older
properties to reduce labor time.* Investment in computers is greatest in
the head offices and reservation centers of the national chains, and has led
to the reduction of clerical staff needs. During the 1960's, some large
hotels made use of computers to as.sist with accounting, reservations, and
staff scheduling. In more recent years, the advent of cheaper systems,
time sharing, and the development of mini-computers has brought computer
technology within the reach of most establishments of over 100 rooms.
Part-time, Part-year
The use of computers has enabled management to make more accurate
short-term forecasts of expected occupancy levels. Schedulers then attempt
to match weekly occupancy forecasts with staffing needs. Organized labor
supports this development as a way to stabilize the housekeeping department
by assigning scheduled work on the basis of seniority. The net effect,
Ernest Henderson, founder of the Sheraton Corporation, details the
reasoning for such changes in this discussion of Boston's Copley Plaza:
"When the hotel was built, in 1912, labor was cheap and uncomplaining.
Waiters were forced to cover unconscionable distances and to climb long
flights of stairs to serve exacting guests, but in those days this was of
little concern. Now things were different; union wages were rising sharply
It would be hard to move the kitchen to the lobby floor, but if we couldn't
bring the mountain to Mohammed, perhaps Mohammed would be willing to move.
For sixty thousand dollars the principal dining room could be transplanted
to a lower level. Waiters could halve the distance covered in their accus-
tomed shuttle between temperamental chefs and ever-demanding diners, and
avoid the endless stairs. Payroll savings and faster service would earn,
we estimated, some forty thousand dollars a year, a better return at least
than the more familiar three or four percent paid on government bonds."
From Ernest Henderson, The World of Mr. Sheraton (New York: David McKay,
Co., 1960), p. 81-82.
- 161 -
however, may be to increase the number of part-time ("regular part-time"
in union houses) workers with, or without, the use of computers.
The average number of hours worked in a week in the nation's hotel-
motel industry has declined steadily since 1958. In 1958 the average work-
week was 40 hours. By 1972 it had declined to 33 hours, and in 1977 the
figure stood at 30.9 hours. One third of the reported increase in the num-
ber of workers in the industry between 1972 and 1977 can be said to result
*
from a shortened work-week.
In addition to making use of more part-time workers, the industry
has, over the years, employed temporary part-year help to meet peak
demand (primarily in the summer quarter). According to the 1968-1975
LEED file analysis, the proportion of industry workers which were employed
one quarter or less in New England has, on a yearly basis, ranged from
36.8% to 42.9%. Only 16.6% to 22.6% of all workers were employed on a
full-year basis during the same time span.
Figure shows the flow of quarterly workers over the period. The
number of workers employed four quarters remained virtually unchanged from
1961 to 1975, while the number of three quarter workers changed little from
1965 to 1975. Workers employed one quarter or less exhibited the greatest
*Average annual employment increased from 697,900 in 1972 to 880,500
in 1977. Because of the dimunition in hours, 59,800 jobs were "created"
by shrinking the work week from 33.14 hours to 30.88 hours.
Figure 4
Employment Levels by Number of Quarters Worked
1958 - 1975
Number of
Workers in
SIC 701
(00's)
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800
- - -*...*...
300.'
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- .- 
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Source: LEEDs File.
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with respect to variable and fixed labor. Moreover, 
the reduction has
been much more marked for fixed labor. Labor is becoming less of a "quasi-
fixed factor of production" because of shifts in the mode of 
operation,
deskilling, automation, and an increase in customer "self-service."
Table 14
Variable and Fixed Labor: New England
"Variable "
One Quarter
Workers
29,800
38,100
Available
Hotel Rooms
34,128
39,419
"Variable" Worker
Per Room
.44
.36
-18.2
"Fixed
Four Quarter
Workers
16,500
16,600
Available Motel
Motor Hotel Rooms
33,016
66,682
"Fixed" Worker
Per Room
.25
.16
-36.0
Source: LEED file, Census of Selected Service Industries, 1963,1972.
1963
1972
1963
1972
Total
Available
Rooms
67,144
106,101
1963
1972
Percent
Change
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variability, fluctuating from 44,400 in 1969, to 34,300 in 1971 (a decrease
of 22.7 percent).
Variable and Fixed Labor
A comparison between the number of workers employed for one quarter
or less and the occupancy level data found on page 100, show a high (.69)
positive correlation. This indicates that the temporary (one quarter)
worker is representative of variable labor within the firms themselves.
Year-to-year fluctuations in demand for lodging services (resulting from
the business cycle, transportation patterns, weather, etc.) are likely to
elicit an increase in variable labor only.
The fact that the number of four-quarter workers increased only
slightly when the industry peaked in 1969, and then fell off again to
the 1963-1964 level, suggests that new investment in facilities requiring
fixed (four quarters) labor did not exceed the reduction in the need for
fixed labor caused by capital contraction.
Data from the Census of Selected Service Industries show that the
number of establishments with payroll in New England declined between 1963
and 1972* by 292 establishments. However, the number.of rooms available
increased by 38,957, with motels and motor hotels accounting for 86 percent
of the gain. This suggests that the relative shift in investment away from
the hotel type of operation has made the industry less labor intensive both
*
Two years with similar occupancy rates.
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Low Wage
Wages for variable labor are kept at very low levels. According to
LEED file data for 1975, total average wages for workers employed one
quarter or less in S. I. C. 701 (hotels-motels) were only 46 percent
of the average for all workers employed for the same period in the region.*
The same analysis applied to workers employed four quarters shows little
improvement: workers in S. I. C. 701 earned only 57 percent of the regional
average.*
On the national level, data from Employment and Earnings for February,
1979, show that the average weekly earnings for a worker in the hotel-motel
industry was $118.95. This amounts to only 56 percent of the average
weekly earnings for all workers in private industry ($212.05). Clearly,
then, hotels-motels are among the lowest paying of any industry.**
Importance to the Region, The Worker
Industry apologists and many public officials tend to downplay the
low-wage, unstable job aspect of hotel-motel employment, and play-up the
importance of the industry to the city, state, or region. Low wages are
often glossed over as being unimportant because, as one report states:
*These figures represent only those wages earned in those industries
supplying primary employment during the defined number of quarters.
**There are only ten three-digit S. I. C.'s paying less than hotels
and motels. These figures include reported tips and service charges added
to customers bills and distributed to employees. Tipped workers account
for approximately 38% of all non-supervisory workers according to various
BLS area wage surveys.
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studies of the commercial lodging industry .., indicate that
well over half of its jobs are clerical or in general housekeeping
or food service occupations to which young seasonal workers are
highly adaptable.7
Employment in the hotel-motel industry in New England is more seasonal
than the nation as a whole. Comparative data for five New England states
for the years 1972 and 1977 show that the region (less Maine) has exhibited
greater seasonality of employment in the latter period. Data for the
U. S. as a whole show the opposite trend:
Seasonality Index
(Coefficient of Vari- Mean Monthly Employment
ation For Monthly (000's)
Employment Totals)
Year Year
1972 1977 1972 1977
Massachusetts .102 .150 16.5 
18.4
New Hampshire .308 .267 5.1 5.6
Vermont .131 .143 3.8 
4.3
Rhode Island .170 .192 1.8 2.2
Four state total .140 .159 27.3 30.5
U. S. A. .071 .066 699.3 
880.5
Source: Department(s) of Employment Security for States, 
Employment and
Earnings, 1972, 1977.
7
"The Tourism and Recreation Story In Massachusetts," (Boston: Division
of Tourism, Massachusetts Department of Commerce, 1972), pp. 26-27.
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The data also indicates that employment growth in the industry has
been slower in New England (ll.7%1 than in the country as a whole (25.9%).
Of those states surveyed, Rhode Island was the fastest growing (17.9%),
but Massachusetts registered the greatest numerical gain (1,900 workers,
or 59% of the four-state total increase).
Figure 5 illustrates the importance of the industry to the region as
an employer, and to the employee as a source of income. The solid line
shows the percentage of all workers in the region employed during any point
in the year in S. I. C. 701 according to the LEEDs file. The dotted line
8
depicts the region's unemployment rate. The dashed line indicates the
percentage of employees who worked in S. I. C. 701 and for whom employment
in the industry provided the majority of their total wages for the year.
What this shows us is that (1) the lodging industry is clearly
pro-cyclical with respect to employment*; and (2) that during economic
8
See Lynn Browne, "Regional Unemployment Rates: Why Are They So Dif-
ferent?," New England Economic Review (July-August, 1978), p. 21.
*The only real exception was the industry decline during the gas
crisis of late 1973. The fact that the industry's percentage of total New
England employment rose slightly in 1975 should not be misconstrued -- it
is just that employment in S. I. C. 701 did not fall as rapidly as did the
region as a whole. If the percentage line was flat throughout the period,
the industry would be as cyclical as the region. The fact that the percen-
tage line is negatively correlated with the unemployment rate line shows
that the effects of the cycles are exaggerated in the industry.
Figure 5
Relative Importance of the Hotel-Motel Industry in Regional Employment
Percentage
14JEmployment
10
Percentage
in Region
2.00
Percent of all workers in 701
1.90
1.80
N
U
1.70
0 1.60
---.......... ....-- /
ew England
nemployment Rate
Major
Job
9O** 0
9
00000/
65 66 67 68 69
Source: See text.
8
6
64d
62
60
1-
ON
58
56
54
70 71 72 73 74
- 169 -
downturns the industry becomes a more important source of income for
a greater proportion of those workers still in it. TLe industry is
well equipped to absorb excess entrants into the labor market during
boom times, but fails to serve as a refuge for displaced workers
during cyclical downturns.
Organizational and Structural Trends for the Future in New England
1. Risk Shifting: Capital
The key to the structure of profitability within the industry
has become the capacity to shift risk onto other actors. Income
participation clauses on the part of lenders, incentive fees for
management firms, and market "creaming" are all examples of the risk
shifting trend. But a further intensification of risk shifting
generates a series of problems for public policy -- small proprietors
are progressively pushed out of the market and an increased dependence
on public capital subsidies evolves. Cities, in their attempt to
attract hotels and convention centers, must commit themselves to large
capital subsidies. Yet the benefits from these expenditures are
ambiguous:
... Cities are making massive investments in convention centers
based on insufficient information, scarce sampling, and sketchy
feasibility studies. There is a great possibility that many
cities will lose out in the future, as the growing pool of
facilities are constructed and as the competition for business
grows more intense, cost is increasingly favorable for
convention sponsors and unfavorable for cities. 9
9 Gary A. Tobin, The Changing Structure of the City: What Happened
to the Urban Crisis, (Beverly Hills: Sage Publications, Volume 16,
Urban Affairs Annual Reviews), 1979.
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2. Capital-Substitution Effect: Labor
This trend is historical both in New England and the nation.
As capital intensive techniques are substituted for labor, the work
force shrinks, becomes deskilled and opportunities for occupational
advancement decline. The public policy area affected by this trend
is the increased reliance of workers on government institutions in
the form of unemployment insurance and welfare services.
The increased instability of the labor force is accentuated
by the highly seasonal and cyclical nature of the demand for lodging
in New England. Moreover, the labor market becomes reshaped as a
result of the capital-labor substitution. Employers draw on new
workers to act as variable capital. As a top corporate officer of a
large chain candidly admitted in an interview:
We prefer to locate in an area with a substantial
minority base.
But the lack of opportunity for workers creates disgruntled employees,
high turnover, and labor/management tension; or, as described by
another executive:
Blacks do not seem to have the proper subservient
attitude anymore.
3. Economic Conditions: The "Enfranchisement Boom
The recent trend of ownership re-organization and restructuring
through enfranchisement, as illustrated by figures for the last
decade, will continue. From the perspective of the chains, the
increased competition for new enfranchisements makes New England
attractive due to its historical low percentage of chain presence.
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The other factors reinforcing this development are the marginal
benefits from the standpoint of portfolio mix and diversification in
investment strategies. While,on the other hand, small proprietors
perceive the chains as providing instant capital accessibility. As
economic conditions worsen and market growth shrinks, the national
name, status and organization of the chains makes an association appear
as the most secure strategy for small proprietors.
Will enfranchisement be the panacea for small proprietors? There
are a number of reasons to be skeptical about this solution. First,
enfranchisement raises the fixed costs of operating. And, as the study
has shown, the highly seasonal demand, in conjunction with the higher
fixed costs will make the break-even point even that much more difficult to
achieve. Second, given the local nature of the New England market,
it is unclear how important and effective it is to have an expensive
national reservation system. Third, based on our interviews with
managers of recently franchised hotels, the "quick" money they had
anticipated due to their new status has not materialized.
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